Protecting Our Spaces of Memory: Rediscovering the Seneca Nation Settlement Act Through Archives [2021-9]
Rebecca Chapman 173

Emily Marcum 207
American Association of Law Libraries

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Archival spaces act as collective memory, and the need to preserve and protect those spaces is critical for understanding historical events. To illustrate the idea of archival space as a space of memory, this article looks at the Seneca Nation Settlement Act, which is more fully understood through the use and interpretation of archival materials.

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Introduction

§ 1 Archival spaces serve as a society’s collective memory. They inform us of our past and our present when our memory falls short. A case in point is the Seneca Nation Settlement Act (SNSA). 1 A journey through archival sources explains why and how the SNSA came about, illuminates a disconnect between the Act’s substance and the public’s perception of it, and illustrates the continued need to support and protect archives as spaces of memory.

§ 2 Legislative materials about the SNSA outline congressional review of the bill and what appeared important to congressional leaders around 1990. Yet to appreciate the need for the Act and the reasoning behind its terms, and to paint a complete picture of the Act in its historical context, we must immerse ourselves in the archival history of Seneca land disputes and treaty rights.

§ 3 Our archival journey begins in the 18th century with relations between the Seneca Nation, Great Britain, and the colony of New York. The journey continues with two different aspects of the 19th century: the Ogden years and the Vreeland years. Next, we move to the Everett Commission’s review of and conclusions about land claims at the beginning of the 20th century. The journey then brings us to the 1940s and 1950s to consider federal legislation favoring New York State, after which we focus on the 1960s and 1970s and the federal government’s actions involving the Kinzua Dam and the Indian Claims Commission. Finally, the last 20 years of our journey review Seneca environmental disputes and some land claim litigation.

§ 4 After using the review of Seneca land claims to illustrate how archives serve as memory spaces, the discussion turns to preserving and protecting archival spaces, which fill an important, but often overlooked, role in our memory. This article delves into the concept of memory spaces and ideas that can be used to further protect and preserve these spaces.

Passage of the Seneca Nation Settlement Act: The 1990s

Mechanics of Passage

§ 5 The speed at which the SNSA passed through the legislative process gives us some idea what Congress thought about it. The SNSA began life as H.R. 5367 with New York representatives Matthew McHugh and Amory Houghton as co-sponsors. The bill had 38 House representatives sponsoring its passage. The bill started out in review with the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, which conducted hearings in September 1990. Less than two weeks later, the committee insisted on amendments. The amended bill went out of committee for House consideration on October 10, 1990, under H.R. Rep. No. 101-832. Ben Nighthorse Campbell, the House representative from Colorado,

moved to pass the amended bill in the House. The House debated only 40 minutes before passing the SNSA onto the Senate.

¶6 The Senate took up the bill on October 12, 1990. It passed the Senate without amendment on October 16, 1990, and went to the President for signature on October 24, 1990. President George H.W. Bush signed the bill into law less than two weeks later.

Terms of Passage

¶7 The law provides a brief statement at its beginning conveying the political climate and the reason for its passage: “Disputes concerning leases of tribal lands within the city of Salamanca and the congressional villages, New York, have strained relations between the Indian and non-Indian communities and have resulted in adverse economic impacts affecting both communities.”

¶8 In subsequent paragraphs, however, the Act’s explanation of what events led to its passage are anemic. The Act focuses on leases awarded in the 1870s and judgments

2. Id. § 2(a)(1).
3. Id. § 2(a)(2)(A)–(E).
awarded to the Seneca Nation for land claims brought before the Indian Claims Commission.\(^4\) Little else is provided for historical context. The law states:

In 1952, the Seneca Nation filed a claim with the Indian Claims Commission against the United States for use of improper lease fees, and in 1977 a settlement was reached regarding such claim, providing for payment of $600,000 to the Seneca Nation covering the period beginning in 1870 to the end of 1946.\(^5\)

\(\text{¶9}\) The law agrees that the lease payments given to the Senecas were inadequate and refers to the leases’ expiration in 1991.\(^6\) Thus, Congress passed the SNSA to continue leasing arrangements under a more equitable structure, to promote healing between local groups, and to settle past “inequities” on behalf of the Seneca Nation.\(^7\)

\(\text{¶10}\) To cure the “inequities,” the Act offers that the Senecas enter into new lease arrangements with the city, the congressional villages, and any other interested lessee.\(^8\) It is implied that these new leases would include higher rental payments and more favorable terms to the Seneca Nation.\(^9\) Moreover, all parties would manage this set of transactions without the federal government’s input.\(^10\) For the completion of these new leases under better terms, the Seneca Nation would release all prior claims against the United States and the city, congressional villages, and other lessees.\(^11\) Finally, to entice the Seneca Nation to enter into new leases and release claims, the United States and New York State would provide settlement funds for the release of land claims.\(^12\)

\(\text{¶11}\) The federal share of settlement funds came to $30,000,000 for the Seneca Nation.\(^13\) An additional $5,000,000 would be earmarked for economic and community development in and around the city of Salamanca.\(^14\) Another $2,000,000 would be placed in an interest-bearing account for the Seneca Nation.\(^15\) The Seneca Nation Council would administer the funds in this account under a Seneca-approved plan for economic development.\(^16\) Income accruing on the account would fund government operations and general welfare programs for the Seneca.\(^17\) Finally, a sum of $3,000,000 would be placed in an escrow account for the Seneca Nation for up to 10 years.\(^18\)

\(4.\) Id. § 2(a)(2)(E).
\(5.\) Id.
\(6.\) Id. § 2(a)(3)–(4).
\(7.\) Id. § 2(b).
\(8.\) Id. § 4(a)–(c).
\(9.\) Id.
\(10.\) Id. §§ 4(a)–(c), 5.
\(11.\) Id.
\(12.\) Id. § 6.
\(13.\) Id. § 6(b)(1).
\(14.\) Id. § 6(b)(2)(A).
\(15.\) Id. § 6(b)(2)(B)(i).
\(16.\) Id.
\(17.\) Id.
\(18.\) Id. § 6(b)(2)(B)(ii).
Additionally, New York State would pay the Seneca Nation $16,000,000 in cash and $9,000,000 in additional economic development funds.\footnote{Id. § 6(c).}

\S 12 None of the money provided, however, could be spent until the Seneca Nation executed new leases.\footnote{Id. § 7.} Once the Seneca completed new leases and acquired the appropriated funds, they could purchase some of their aboriginal territory back.\footnote{Id. § 8(c).} In this way, Congress sought to cure the “inequities” of the past by providing settlement funds that the Seneca Nation could use to repurchase lands that were previously taken through unlawful means. Congress meant for this settlement effort to end all differences and conflicts from the past, but it did not fully understand how those difficulties began.

\S 13 The language of the Act highlights that Congress missed or ignored the complete history around the Seneca Nation’s land issues. The Act begins its tale of land claims with the incursion of railroads into Seneca Territory in the 1850s.\footnote{Id. § 2(a)(2)(A)–(B).} It notes that leases were created with railroad employees and farmers absent federal approval. The leases were not favorable to the Seneca.\footnote{Id. § 2(a)(2)(A)–(B).} The leases were declared invalid, but an Act of Congress in 1875 upheld certain leases and permitted leasing to continue.\footnote{Id. § 2(a)(2)(C)–(D). An amendment in 1890 permitted these leases to exist for 99 years.\footnote{Id.}

\S 14 The SNSA language suggests that Congress understood that the 1875 Act and its amendment in 1890 should not have occurred. Moreover, Congress agreed that the federal government permitted land speculators to swindle the Seneca Nation out of their homelands. The Indian Claims Commission said as much in its 1977 opinion. Congress appeared ready to address the matter almost 15 years after that judgment. But Congress did not seem deeply interested enough to understand the historical nuances involved. In a September 13, 1990, hearing on the legislation, Representative Campbell had the following exchange with expert witness Laurence Hauptman:

Mr. CAMPBELL. Professor Hauptman?

Mr. HAUGHTMAN. Yes.

Mr. CAMPBELL. If I could interject?

Mr. HAUGHTMAN. Sure.

Mr. CAMPBELL. I think most of us are really aware of a lot of the injustices that have happened to tribal groups; we hear it pretty regularly here. And certainly we are aware of the injustices that have happened to the Seneca Nation. But, in the interest of time, we would prefer to avoid going through all the background and kind of get on with this bill.

\footnotetext[19]{Id. § 6(c).}
\footnotetext[20]{Id. § 7.}
\footnotetext[21]{Id. § 8(c).}
\footnotetext[22]{Id. § 2(a)(2)(A)–(B).}
\footnotetext[23]{Id. § 2(a)(2)(A)–(B).}
\footnotetext[24]{Id. § 2(a)(2)(C)–(D).}
\footnotetext[25]{Id.}
Mr. HAUPTMAN. Sure.

Mr. CAMPBELL. So, if you would kind of wind it up, I would appreciate it.26

¶15 But Congress could no longer delay. Congress had to move quickly, most likely because local governments, businesses, and non-Indian homeowners would experience major impacts from the expiration of the 99-year leases.

Public Perspective

¶16 The public’s perspective on the historical details of the Seneca Nation land claims appeared even less informed than Congress’s. The most detailed account came from the New York Times. In her article, Elizabeth Kolbert suggests that the 1890s leases were a revolutionary idea for their day. The original leases appeared illicit, but Congress eventually caved to pressure and approved them. Moreover, the Seneca Nation’s decision to raise lease rates was received negatively. Kolbert’s article focuses on the difference between the original lease rates and the suggested ones—implying that it is unfair of the Senecas to ask for so much in such a small town. The article mentions racism and long-simmering resentments, but it does not provide much history regarding these topics. It spends more time on Salamanca’s economic depression, which locals blame on the Seneca.27

¶17 General press coverage for the SNSA in 1990 focused more on the plight of white homeowners and city council members than the legal rights of the Seneca Nation.28 Much of the history that precipitated the need for the Act was glossed over or obscured. No one dug very far into the history to provide a greater understanding of the situation.

Using Archives to Bridge the Disconnect Between the Act and the Public’s Perception

¶18 Eric Ketelaar proposes that archives act as spaces of memory.29 In 2008, he reported on the attempts in Northern Ireland to create a historical government archives and on the questions raised in providing a true accounting of the past.30 Ketelaar

30. Id.
compared judicial truths to a more complete and balanced truth in archival work. In his efforts, he found that archives are “living records” shaped with each entry and each use. Because archives can serve as a “living record” in a way that judicial proceedings cannot, Ketelaar argues, archives can become spaces of more accurate, complete, historical memory. As such, archivists’ work could be seen as “memory practice” that works in the public space to avoid historical revisionism.

When we become detached from history, historical revisionism can flourish. In those gaps of memory and history, we create a disconnect between our perceptions and the fullest truth of a matter. This disconnect undermines our understanding and appreciation of a situation. In the case of the SNSA, a disconnect appeared between what was implemented and why, and what the public perceived as such. Moreover, a disconnect appeared among what Tribal leaders felt they needed, what the State leaders felt they needed, and what the Federal government actually implemented for the solution. In this case, the disconnect appeared to alter the public perception and the public memory of the reasoning and spirit behind the SNSA.

Nor has the situation with public memory improved. To obtain a more complete understanding of the Seneca land claims, we need greater historical detail to illuminate deeper truths and refocus the memory. To make this happen, an archival dig is needed to clarify the situation.

Digging Through the Past to Answer Present Questions: One Archival Space of Memory

The archives at the Charles B. Sears Law Library have curated two large collections: the Haas Collection and the Berman Collection. In addition to these collections, the archives contain the legal filings from a number of Seneca land claims from the 1970s and 1980s. Books, journals, periodicals, government documents, legal treatises, and photos produced by Seneca members, professors, lawyers, and journalists on both sides of the issues are included in these collections.

The archival materials provide significant documentation of Seneca land claims from the late 18th century to the passage of the SNSA. As such, the collections produce a more complete historical record of Seneca land issues in context with contemporaneous politics, time, and legal examinations. The review gives a more detailed understanding of why the SNSA came to pass and why it was perceived as necessary.

31. Id. at 9–12.
32. Id. at 12.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 13.
35. Id.
36. See Kolbert, supra note 27.
37. Id.
Beginning the Archival Journey into the SNSA's Passage: The 1700s, Great Britain, New York State, and the Non-Intercourse Act

¶23 The earliest recitation of Seneca land issues begins after the Revolutionary War of 1776 and the defeat of Great Britain.38 The United States and Great Britain settled their land issues at the Treaty of Paris but did not include the Seneca Nation or any other Indian tribe.39 This is notable because the Indian Nations were indispensable parties to any settlement of land issues. The United States attempted to resolve outstanding issues with the Seneca at the Treaty of Fort Stanwix in 1784.40 In that treaty, the Seneca ceded the Ohio River Valley and the Niagara River Strip to the United States.41

¶24 But the United States also had to contend with land issues between the states based on charters previously received from the British crown.42 The New York Constitution of 1777, for instance, stated, “No purchase of . . . contracts for the sale of lands . . . made with or of said Indians within the limits of this State shall be binding . . . or deemed valid unless made under the authority and with the consent of the Legislature of this State.”43

¶25 This document signaled New York’s intention to cancel any land claims of Loyalists after the end of the war.44 But it also asserted an authority over Indian lands in New York that did not sit well with the federal government. Under the Articles of Confederation of 1781, the federal government made clear in Article 9 that only Congress has “sole and exclusive power of . . . regulating the trade and managing all affairs with the Indians not members of any States.”45

¶26 Despite this, in 1786 New York and Massachusetts attempted to settle land issues that arose due to competing charters from the British crown. The interstate agreement, despite its failure to join the Seneca as an indispensable party, granted New York jurisdiction over its borders; Massachusetts retained a right of preemption over the Indian lands within New York’s borders. Thus, Massachusetts believed that it had the first right to purchase any Indian lands in New York, if ever the tribal nations on them wanted to sell and leave. The state then sold the right of preemption to Nathaniel Gorham and Oliver Phelps.46

¶27 Before Gorham and Phelps could act, however, land speculators known as the Genesee Land Company attempted to occupy and sublease all New York Indian lands in 1787 for a lease of 999 years.47 Alarmed, New York invalidated the lease due to its

39. See id. at 6.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 10.
46. Berman Draft Manuscript, supra note 38, at 6, 7.
47. Esther V. Hill, The Iroquois Indians and Their Land Since 1783, 11 Q.J. N.Y. ST. HIST. ASS’N 335,
length and perhaps because the offending company hailed from Canada. With the Genesee Land Company out of the way, Gorham and Phelps immediately attempted to purchase Seneca lands in 1790 and to force the Nation to move out of New York. Unsurprisingly, this did not appeal to the Senecas, and they complained to President George Washington about the propriety of these attempts.

¶28 In fact, the federal government remained concerned about some of this state activity. It needed to make clear that what it promised in treaties with other sovereigns would be upheld, and that it was the supreme authority on Indian matters. The federal government could not afford to lose this authority so quickly to any state or state actors. Thus, the federal government passed the Non-Intercourse Act of 1790 to ensure that Indian land sales did not occur without federal approval and oversight.

¶29 In furtherance of this work, Washington dispatched General Timothy Pickering to visit the Seneca at Tioga Point to explain the Non-Intercourse Act and what it meant for them. He brought them the message from George Washington:

Here, then is the security for the remainder of your lands. No State, nor person can purchase your lands unless at some public treaty, held under the authority of the United States. The general government will never consent to your being defrauded, but it will protect you in your rights.

¶30 In short, Washington and Pickering meant to convey that the Treaty at Fort Stanwix would come before any deal with Gorham and Phelps, and the Seneca would not be forced out of New York. With the failure of their attempt to secure Seneca lands, Gorham and Phelps sold their right of preemption to the Holland Land Company and Robert Morris.

¶31 Around that time, in 1793, Pennsylvania attempted to seize Presqu’ Isle, claiming that the Seneca Nation had given up the land. Specifically, Pennsylvania had convinced Seneca Chief Cornplanter to cede the area for money and managed to obtain a
Congressional resolution of the exchange. Pennsylvania began building up and militarizing the area, but the remainder of the Seneca Nation and its chiefs had not approved the sale, and it could not be held valid. The federal government knew that a treaty would be needed to avoid war and ensure federal oversight of Indian land sales.

\(\text{¶}32\) Again, Washington sent Pickering to deal with this situation, instructing him to obtain title to Presqu’ Isle in exchange for sufficient land to avoid war. The result of his exchanges became the Treaty of Canandaigua in 1794. In that treaty, the Seneca received back most of the Niagara River Strip and the Allegany and Cattaraugus Territories ceded at Fort Stanwix. In exchange, they ceded title to Presqu’ Isle. In addition, the Treaty of Canandaigua reiterated that the United States would protect the Seneca Nation’s interests in its lands and would not permit sales and removal.

\(\text{¶}33\) Regardless, nonfederal actors continued trying to move the Seneca off their land absent federal approval. The federal government amended the Non-Intercourse Act in 1793, 1796, 1799, and 1802, trying to tighten restrictions on Indian land sales. In fact, New York continued entering into treaties with the Seneca for land exchanges by insisting that the Non-Intercourse Act did not apply or that New York possessed concurrent jurisdiction over Indians in their state.

\(\text{¶}34\) Even more strange than New York’s argument, in 1797 Robert Morris and the Holland Land Company purchased Seneca Nation lands that included parts of the Niagara River Strip. Gorham and Phelps had sold their preemption interest to Holland Land Company and Robert Morris after they were unable to move the Seneca. Later, the Holland Land Company sold its share of the interest to the Ogden Land Company. The preemption right was never legally determined to be invalid at the time so, absent a legal challenge, it remained an issue outstanding on title.

\(\text{¶}35\) In 1797, with the Treaty of Big Tree, Morris and Ogden convinced Seneca leaders to cede large tracts of land. Morris and Ogden managed this by presenting the women’s council with presents and convincing the women to use their influence with

57. Id. at 3–5.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 8.
61. Id.
62. Some of this area was referred to as the Buffalo Creek Reservation. See Hill, supra note 47, at 341–42. The Niagara River Strip’s southern portion was returned to the Seneca, but they would permit an easement for a federal road to run through it. Berman Draft Manuscript, supra note 38, at 13–16.
63. Berman Draft Manuscript, supra note 38, at 8.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 10–12; see Hauptman, supra note 43, at 18–19.
67. Id.
68. Hill, supra note 47, at 349–52.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
the men so they would sign the treaty. The U.S. Senate approved the sale, and the President proclaimed it in accordance with the Non-Intercourse Act.

¶36 Deciding to press its luck after this turn of events, New York attempted to enter into a treaty with the Seneca Nation for the southern portion of the Niagara River Strip in 1802. New York immediately began to sell parts of this land to speculators and develop the area around it. That said, the Treaty of 1802 was never ratified by the Senate or proclaimed by the President. New York leased and developed this land without federal approval.

**Seneca Nation in the 1800s: The Ogden Years**

¶37 The resistance of the federal government to these tactics did not discourage the Ogden agents or New York State. New York continued its attempts to shift jurisdiction over Indians to the state. In parallel, the state continued to argue for concurrent jurisdiction over the Seneca.

¶38 The Holland Land Company, claiming the right of first refusal on New York Seneca lands to be sold, sold this interest to the Ogden Land Company in 1810. Around this time, the railroads began to obtain leases for their use and for their employees’ use across New York Indian lands. Ogden’s agents interfered with Seneca politics to get favorable conditions and to further Seneca removal. Frank Lankes describes the right of first refusal this way:

> This right has been termed a pre-emptive title although there wasn’t a shred of title initially. It was a right to purchase Indian land in New York when and if they decided to sell, nothing more than that. However, it was implemented to force them into selling, and in the possession of Ogden and Company, it became a bludgeon that was applied without mercy.

Ogden and his agents used whiskey, bribery, force, and fraud to achieve their ends.

¶39 In response, the Seneca Nation passed its Act of 1821 and removed white non-leaseholders from their territory. Seneca Chiefs Cornplanter and Red Jacket traveled to meet with John Calhoun in the U.S. Department of War to complain about Ogden’s attempts to steal tribal land. Calhoun suggested relocation to Wisconsin, but he also insisted that the decision remained with the tribe and they could not be forcibly removed.

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72. *Id.*
74. *Id.*
76. *Id.*
77. *Id.*
78. *Id.*
80. *Id.* at 16, 29–30.
81. *Id.* at 17–20.
¶40 Despite Calhoun’s assurances, in 1826, Oliver Forward came to the Seneca and claimed that he was a U.S. commissioner sent to negotiate purchase of all New York Seneca lands for Ogden. Forward brought the local Indian agent and made his pitch to Red Jacket. Red Jacket consulted the other leaders. He came back to Forward indicating that the Seneca refused to sell. Forward threatened Red Jacket and told him that all U.S. aid and money to the Seneca would be shut off if they did not comply. The local Indian agent agreed and supported the threat.82

¶41 Some chiefs signed the 1826 treaty document that gave almost all Seneca lands to Ogden; some signed thinking they had no other choice, and others were bribed to do so. But these decisions needed to be ratified by a vote of the Seneca people, and only 7 percent approved. Still, the document made its way to Congress for approval. But a letter to John Quincy Adams, dated May 19, 1827, detailed the above deficiencies and asked that the federal government not approve the treaty document. The Senate and the President did not approve it.83

¶42 Ogden’s next attempt involved relocating the Menominee through the Treaty of 1832 and taking that land to offer the Seneca a new place to live. Ogden thought he could relocate the Seneca to Wisconsin and get the federal government and the Indian tribes to pay for it through a series of tribal land exchanges. Then, Ogden could purchase the New York land and develop it without tribal influence. The Seneca were not interested in moving to Wisconsin, and so the deal expired.84

¶43 Three years later, Ogden tried again. This time, Ogden tried to force a relocation to Kansas. He attempted to bribe certain chiefs to visit Kansas and convince their neighbors to agree to removal. Again, this was a decision that required council approval, but Ogden tried to convince the chiefs to go without alerting others. Liquor and bribes flowed freely. Ogden’s agents spent two years trying to obtain signatures on a treaty document that also attached a deed conveying all Seneca and Tuscarora land to the Ogden Land Company. Only 16 chiefs signed the document to remove to Kansas. Further, the treaty and attached deeds were drawn up by, formally executed by, and witnessed by the same people: Commissioner Ransom Gillet and the superintendent of Massachusetts.85

¶44 Gillet tried to convince the Senate to ratify the treaty, but the Senate refused on the grounds that Gillet had gone beyond his scope of authority and engaged in double dealing.86 The Senate struck the requirement for removal and would not ratify the treaty document until the commissioner went back and explained the provisions to the tribe.87 Gillet also had to obtain a sufficient number of signatures to indicate a majority

82. Id. at 21–22.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 30–31.
85. Id. at 30–35.
86. Id. at 36.
approval of leaders. Gillet returned to the Seneca and continued his tactics of threats and bribes through Ogden. The meetings dragged on for months because Gillet would not stop until the Seneca agreed. Despite his efforts, he obtained only 31 questionable signatures during the council meetings. Gillet remained, and using questionable means outside of the council meetings, he finally reached the 41 signatures necessary for majority approval. This was done on December 26, 1838.

After an investigation by the War Department and the Bureau of Indian Affairs, both the secretary and the commissioner recommended rejecting the treaty. Despite these two officials’ documented concerns, the Senate approved the Treaty of 1838, and the President proclaimed it. The outcome was devastating to the Seneca, and sympathetic Quakers began to assemble a book of documentary evidence establishing the rampant fraud, forgeries, bribes, and harassment that had produced this deal. The book circulated and caused a great stir in Washington because it clearly indicated that the federal government had made a mistake in approving the treaty. To fix the error, the federal government brought the Seneca and Ogden together again for the Compromise Treaty of 1842. In it, the Seneca lost the Buffalo Creek Reservation but regained the Allegany and Cattaraugus Territories. Despite the compromise, many Seneca lost their land to Ogden.

**Seneca Nation in the 1800s and Early 1900s: The Vreeland Years**

Not to be deterred by clouded title issues with Ogden, New York continued its pursuit for Seneca land and jurisdiction. New York commissioners, on behalf of the state, traveled to each reservation to observe, meet, and report back on “the Indian problem.” The commissioners’ report detailed how New York distributed annuities, collected rent on leases, worked with relief programs, and managed healthcare and

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89. *Id.* at 38–41.
90. *Id.*
91. *Id.*
92. *Id.*
93. *Id.* at 41. It is also interesting to note here that New York’s secretary of state accepted and recorded the treaty and deeds on September 11, 1838, months before its final approval in the U.S. Senate. Whipple Report, *supra* note 87, at 29.
94. Lankes, *supra* note 79, at 44.
95. *Id.* at 44–45. This treaty is also known as the Treaty of Buffalo Creek of 1838.
96. *Id.* at 45.
97. *Id.*
98. *Id.*
99. *Id.*
100. Frank J. Lankes, *Bennett’s Settlement*, 4 Niagara Frontier 116–18 (1958) (Henry Two Guns loses his property to Ogden in 1843. The writer pinpoints the location to be Blossom, N.Y., now occupied by a town.)
102. *Id.* at 4.
scholarships for New York Indians. But the real reason for this litany of achievements was to assert that New York State had, or should have, de facto concurrent jurisdiction over New York Indians. They argued that New York State, in its list of activities with the Indians, could eventually persuade the federal government to cede jurisdiction to the state in some areas. In their report to the state, the commissioners observed “one additional step would place these Indians under the protection of all of the laws of the State.” The commissioners suggested that the state work toward “exterminat[ing] the tribe and preserve the individual; make citizens of them and divide their lands in severality.” In short, the commissioners urged allotment and assimilation, akin to the Dawes Act of 1887.

¶ The commissioners’ ideas about de facto concurrent jurisdiction could not be constitutionally sustained. In fact, a delegate of the Seneca Nation, Andrew John, pointed out this argument and its fallacy to the federal government in a petition to Congress related to Seneca lease payments in 1898. In his petition, he stated:

That Congress has at all times exercised supervision over the Indian tribes and nations is a matter of common knowledge and needs no citation here . . . . The Supreme Court of New York and the Supreme Court of the United States have decided that the legislature of New York has no jurisdiction over the subject, can give no force or validity to any leases of land within said reservation, nor give any authority to such in any way.

As such, New York’s attempts to reframe the issues and characterize their work in a manner that led to greater jurisdiction was flawed. The flaw in the reasoning, however, did not stop admirers from continuing similar work to produce the desired result of total state jurisdiction or full Indian removal.

¶ Edward Vreeland, a New York representative in the 56th Congress, made no secret of his intent to move the Seneca off their land. He served in Congress from 1899 to 1913 and never stopped introducing legislation to remove the Seneca and clear title issues with the Ogden Land Company. Vreeland, a resident of Salamanca and very well connected, wanted the city to flourish without Seneca influence.

¶ Vreeland’s determination came after the Congress of 1875 approved leases on Seneca land that began with the railroads and railroad employees. The leases began around 1810, and none of them were completed with any federal guidelines or oversight. This lack of federal oversight and prior approval appeared in contravention of the Treaty at Canandaigua in 1794 and the U.S. Constitution’s grant of sole authority

103. Id. at 6.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 64.
107. Id. at 68–69.
108. S. Doc. No. 55-190 (1898).
109. Id. at 6–7.
110. Hauptman, supra note 75, at 1–5.
111. Id. at 1; S. Doc. No. 55-190, at 8–10 (1898).
over Indian affairs to the federal government.\textsuperscript{113} Yet supportive statements from the commissioner of Indian affairs, which seemed questionable and lacked sound evidentiary reasoning, gave rise to approval of these leases.\textsuperscript{114} The railroads, their employees, and other white individuals subleased the lands further for profits that never went to the Seneca.\textsuperscript{115} All told, 420 leases made $1.36 million in profit in 1875 for the white settlers that subleased the lands.\textsuperscript{116} The Seneca received almost none of it.\textsuperscript{117} What little monies were collected by the Tribal Council often did not make it to the rest of the Nation’s membership.\textsuperscript{118} Salamanca became completely encompassed by the Seneca Territories, and white locals outnumbered the Seneca five to one.\textsuperscript{119} Vreeland wanted to end the matter with his own idea of victory.\textsuperscript{120}

\textsuperscript{50} Vreeland and others wanted to apply the ideas of allotments and assimilation to the Seneca.\textsuperscript{121} He knew the application of allotments would enable Salamanca and white landowners to purchase the city and other tracts of land. To make it work, however, he needed to pass legislation that extinguished competing claims on Seneca land and clear the clouded title.\textsuperscript{122}

\textsuperscript{51} Inspired by the Dawes Act and the Whipple Report, Vreeland introduced H.R. 12270 and H.R. 7262 in an effort to clear title and allot the land. These bills offered almost $2 million to the Seneca for Kansas land claims, but the money would be used to pay off the Ogdens for their interests in the New York land. With title cleared, the Seneca New York lands could be allotted. Vreeland almost succeeded, but the bills died in the Senate.\textsuperscript{123}

\textsuperscript{52} In 1915, another attempt was made in Congress in the form of H.R. 18735. This bill sought to create an allotment of Seneca lands by first seeking to extinguish any cloud of title from the Ogden claim. Under section 1 of the bill, the attorney general would challenge the Ogden claim in court and hopefully defeat it. Sections 3 and 4 of the bill would create a commission that could undertake the process of allotment and protect the land from sale for 25 years. These sections also assumed that New York State would have a representative on the commission. Section 7 stated that if the Ogden claim was not extinguished, then the Indians could sell to them immediately. Section 8 indicated that all New York Indians would become U.S. citizens and citizens of New York State.\textsuperscript{124}
¶53 The Department of Justice (DOJ) responded to this bill with a list of objections. First, DOJ noted that a commission could not act on allotments before the issue of clouded title was settled in court. Second, an allotment could not be held in restricted fee for a temporary period of time. This “restricted fee” status of land, making it inalienable absent federal approval, could not simply change with an expiration date. The status could not just “terminate” automatically at a given time. Third, it was not legally permissible to declare the Indians to be citizens by virtue of this act. Moreover, DOJ questioned what appeared to be a reach of authority on behalf of New York State and warned that federal authority over Indian affairs must remain intact in any approved legislation.

¶54 The secretary of the interior (SOI) went even further, with a list of objections that questioned the validity of any nonfederal claim to the land except for that of the Seneca Nation. In listing the history of transactions between the Seneca Nation and other entities, the SOI noted Ogden’s claim to the land appeared possibly invalid and definitely problematic. In considering the history of land exchanges and leases, he stated:

Persons whose opinions are not without weight have even suggested that the Company has no valid claim against these lands, basing their opinions on the grounds that New York had no power to sell to Massachusetts, nor Massachusetts to convey to its assignees. Be that as it may, we find that the claim has stood and been repeatedly recognized by the courts.

¶55 As such, the SOI felt the Ogden claim needed to be settled before any “allotments” under the bill could occur. Moreover, New York Indians appeared to be managing their own land and creating their own sort of allotment system without the federal government’s interference. The SOI questioned the wisdom of breaking up their system to replace it with a new one suggested by outsiders. Moreover, he noted that the bill appeared to be another attempt by New York to exert control over the Indians, and the Treaty of 1794 made clear that New York lacked authority to force the issue.

¶56 With objections from DOJ and the SOI, neither New York State nor the federal government tried to allot the lands again.

125. *Id.*
126. *Id.* at 4–5.
127. Restricted fee status means an Indian or tribe cannot encumber or alienate land without federal approval. This status cannot be changed without congressional approval. Thus, an automatic expiration or alteration of status cannot take place via a time limit or sunset provision. New action by Congress would be needed to change the land status.
129. *Id.*
130. *Id.*
131. *Id.* at 7–10.
132. *Id.* at 8.
133. *Id.* at 9.
Everett Commission: 1919–1922

¶57 New York State’s next move came in 1919, when it created the Everett Commission to revisit the Indian reservations and report back on the issues involving them. Chairman Everett ordered his fellow commissioners to learn about each tribe’s issues from a legal perspective and submit their own briefing for his final review. He did so because New York had tried to find a way to implement the Dawes Act with the New York Indians and failed. Legislation had failed in 1888, 1902, and again in 1914. Further, the Dawes Act’s implementation across the country appeared to be failing, and New York realized that it needed to find another way to address its land issues with the tribes.134

¶58 Everett went to each New York tribal territory to visit with and hear from each council about their viewpoints on the land issues.135 Only 6 of the 12 commissioners (including Everett) went to all of the meetings.136 The tone of the meetings differed from those that had come before because they started off with a premise of fairness and a support for the right of self-governance.137 Everett showed his support when he stated:

I believe you are a people and a nation and entitled to be credited and considered as a people and a nation and the occupants of a territory known as a country, now the United States of America. My attitude is that if you did own this country when it was discovered by the white man and it was taken from you without proper and legal and just compensation, it should be returned to you.138

¶59 Council members and Everett discussed the meaning of court cases, holdings, and whether the courts upheld any fraudulent land transaction against the Seneca.139 Everett noted that New York often refused to provide tribes with copies of their treaties, leases, and land deals. Moreover, tribes noted that when they did receive copies, the wording of the terms differed from their notes and memories of the oral conversations.140 Everett agreed that the state had lost some original copies and that new versions of some documents contained different boundary lines and created problems.141

¶60 This refusal of information, and sometimes outright revision of written deals and terms, troubled Everett and appeared to be a sign of fraud.142 He heard in great detail about how the tribes negotiated with President Washington and General Pickering, and how these interactions differed from later negotiations with others.143 He became further distressed to hear about how the Treaties of 1838 and 1842 created the
current situation of lost lands and compromises. After hearing in detail how New York treated the Indians in negotiations, Everett made the initial determination that the Indians owned the land before the arrival of the white man.

Yet New York State also needed to determine jurisdiction. Everett understood that the state’s position of concurrent jurisdiction appeared weak. John Snyder, a member of the Seneca Nation, convinced Everett that jurisdiction remained with the federal government and not New York. Snyder stated the Treaty of 1789 and the Treaty of 1794 spelled out jurisdiction and settled the matter. He implored Everett to review article one of each treaty, and article seven of the Treaty of 1794, to see how the language indicated that the federal government possessed sole jurisdiction. He also cited the Indian Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution and noted that New York could not wield this authority absent a constitutional amendment. He noted that the infamous “Ogden claim” was invalid because the deal struck between Massachusetts and New York was also invalid. Because the states made a land deal that failed to join an indispensable party, the Seneca, they could not swap interests in land they did not own. Nor could they do so without the consent of the tribe. As such, the only owners of Seneca land could be the Seneca.

Snyder impressed Everett with his presentations and documents. He determined at the end of his review that the federal government continued to possess sole jurisdiction over the New York Indians and had assumed all treaty responsibilities from before the U.S. Constitution’s ratification in 1789. In addition, he determined that fraud occurred against the Seneca, and the land remained their land—not New York State’s land.

In his final findings, Everett noted that international law recognized two ways to dispossess people of land: conquest or purchase. Everett believed that England had not accomplished either of these goals, and so it did not have the power to grant treaty power to New York or to Massachusetts in its charter. Moreover, Massachusetts could not receive any title or interest to land in New York by virtue of a piece of paper. As such, Everett concluded that the Ogden claim appeared invalid. But of course, this revelation came too late.

Further still, Everett noted in his final findings that (1) fee title in New York lands began with the Indians, (2) Washington recognized this, and (3) he acknowledged their status as a separate nation in the Treaty at Fort Stanwix. Moreover, because this status had not changed, the lands of New York appeared to be stolen from the Indians by fraud. More specifically, he insisted that six million acres appeared to

144. Id. at 88.
145. Id. at 86.
146. Id. at 90–92.
147. Id. at 96.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 99.
150. Id.
151. Id.
have been stolen from the Iroquois people of New York.152 Given this result, Everett insisted that New York would have to come up with a solution to repay the tribes and repair the damage.153 Everett, however, did not suggest a solution.154

¶65 Everett’s findings were deeply unpopular. Despite this, he managed to achieve a unanimous vote of approval on his findings and conclusions. He needed this approval to finalize the report and have it filed for formal recording. When he attempted on May 17, 1922, to present the final report for filing in the New York Legislature, however, the agents for legislative filing refused it.155

¶66 Because the legislature failed to file the report, copies are hard to find. Hence, an original does not appear here. It would not be the last time that the state of New York would clash with others on controversial arguments surrounding Seneca land and jurisdiction.

United States v. Forness and the Spite Bills: 1940s–1950s

¶67 The fight over jurisdiction continued into the 1940s, and the Seneca became frustrated with leaseholders not paying their rents and challenging Seneca land ownership.156 As of 1939, 25 percent of the leaseholders on Seneca land defaulted on payments, and more than 200 leases had maintained a default status for longer than seven years.157 Meanwhile, the state continued to argue its case before the federal government, outlining the work it completed on behalf of New York tribes, in an effort to establish concurrent de facto jurisdiction.158

¶68 An attorney for the federal government suggested that the Seneca cancel the 99-year leases and create some test cases that might allow for renegotiating the leases with more favorable terms.159 The Seneca attempted to do just that on March 4, 1939. They canceled 800 leases, one of which belonged to the Forness family running a garage in downtown Salamanca. The Forness family had been operating a very profitable business while paying only $4 per year for rent. They had not paid their rent in 11 years. The Seneca asked to increase the rent to $230 per year, and the Fornesses refused. They insisted that the Seneca would lose and legislation would eventually erode Seneca land ownership so that no one had to pay the tribe anything.160 The Seneca eventually won a favorable ruling in the Second Circuit in 1942.161 This led to an eviction process that

152. Hauptman, supra note 75, at 8.
153. Id.
154. Upton, supra note 52, at 99.
155. Id. at 100–03.
156. Hauptman, supra note 75, at 9.
157. Id. at 5–6.
158. Id. at 6.
159. Id. at 9.
160. Id.
the city of Salamanca tried to stop—it failed. By 1944, most lessees accepted new leases on new terms, but the timeframe for expiration did not change.

Around this time, the Department of the Interior began to agree with some of the jurisdictional arguments coming out of New York. Acting Secretary of the Interior Abe Fortas seemed to support letting New York have some areas of jurisdiction provided the Indians consented to it. Felix Cohen became part of the discussion and insisted on consent as a requirement. New York could not gain the consent of the New York Indian tribes but asked that two specific bills pass Congress regardless of the lack of consent.

These bills permitted New York to exercise criminal jurisdiction over New York tribes and take up or avail itself of civil matters that occurred in New York Indian territory. The Department of the Interior and the Bureau of Indian Affairs objected, but two bills on jurisdiction made it to Congress for consideration in 1948. The bills, colorfully referred to as the “spite bills,” passed on July 2, 1948, and September 13, 1950. These pieces of legislation represented a huge turn of events for tribes in New York. These laws are considered the political backlash and response to the *Forness* case.

Around this time, in 1954, the city of Salamanca closed Seneca schools. The city required Seneca children to attend the white schools for their education.

But the real heartache came in 1957, when the federal government condemned part of the Allegany Reservation in an eminent domain action to build the Kinzua Dam. The Seneca tried to stop the effort in court, but the U.S. District Court for the Western District of New York permitted the action. In April 1959, the Seneca tried to get an injunction but failed. The Supreme Court denied their request for a hearing in June of that same year. The tribe tried to get relief in the Indian Claims Commission, but the damage was done. More than 500 families had to be resettled as their homes flooded. The dam was completed in 1965. The Indian Claims Commission eventually

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163. *Id.*
165. *Id.* It should be noted, however, that the civil jurisdiction statute, 25 U.S.C. § 233, stood for the ability of tribal members to avail themselves of civil court proceedings in the state and not for the state to take over all civil matters in the territories.
168. Upton, * supra* note 52, at 154. It was not long after this that Kansas and Iowa managed to get similar bills passed through Congress and Public Law 280 came about. *Id.* at 154–55. The federal government was looking for ways to get out of its trust responsibilities built up in the treaties, and these acts were a way to unload duties and responsibilities unto the states. *Id.* at 154–56. Assimilation was a preferred method by some to deal with Indians. *Id.* This is the same era when the federal government began a large-scale process of termination against federally recognized tribes. *Id.* at 155–56.
awarded the tribe $5 million, but this could not bring back the lost homes and the lost land.\textsuperscript{171}

\textsuperscript{73} Meanwhile, the Ogden Company and its corresponding trust continued to harass the Seneca. In the 1950s, however, Ogden Company sold interests to South Buffalo, West Seneca, Lackawanna, and the Ebenezer Community around Blossom, New York. By the 1950s, Ogden still wanted to take full control of Seneca lands, but the company could not meet the goal because its interests fractionated to a point where they were largely worthless.\textsuperscript{172}

### Indian Claims Commission: 1960s–1970s

\textsuperscript{74} By 1965, the flooding at the Kinzua Dam had displaced families, homes, and graves.\textsuperscript{173} The Seneca started litigation before the Indian Claims Commission, but the process was slow.

\textsuperscript{75} The United States created the Indian Claims Commission in 1946 to deal with land and treaty violations.\textsuperscript{174} Claimants had a five-year window in which to bring claims, and the commission could award monetary damages only as a method of redress.\textsuperscript{175}

\textsuperscript{76} The Seneca case began in 1951, but the court did not issue its decision until 1977. The Seneca case, however, focused not on the Kinzua Dam but on the United States’ failure to adhere to treaty promises and protect the Seneca in all their land sales and leases. The initial filing dealt with the attempts by Gorham and Phelps, the Holland Land Company, the Ogden Land Company, and every ratified deal and treaty therein.\textsuperscript{176}

\textsuperscript{77} In a separate filing, the Indian Claims Commission asserted that the United States could not be held liable to the Seneca for these deals, but the tribe appealed to the Court of Claims.\textsuperscript{177} The Court of Claims agreed with the Indian Claims Commission regarding the Gorham Phelps purchase, but reversed on all others.\textsuperscript{178}

\textsuperscript{78} The Court of Claims found that the passage of the Non-Intercourse Act of 1790 indicated the United States’ willingness to accept a fiduciary responsibility regarding Indian land sales.\textsuperscript{179} The Court of Claims used this same reasoning in other cases for

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Id. at 96–100.
\item Gilbert Pedersen, Early Title to Indian Reservations in Western New York, 3 Niagara Frontier 5, 9, 10–12 (1956–1957).
\item ABRAMS, supra note 170, at 100.
\item Act of Aug. 13, 1946, Ch. 959, 60 Stat. 1049 (1946). Note that the Indian Claims Commission was succeeded by the United States Claims Court in 1982 and the Court of Federal Claims in 1992.
\item Id. at 1052, § 12.
\item Seneca Nation of Indians v. United States, 12 Indian Cl. Comm’n 780 (1963).
\item Seneca Nation of Indians v. United States, 173 Ct. Cl. 917 (1965).
\item Id. at 922–25.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
Indian Country. Finally, on remand, the Indian Claims Commission awarded the Seneca $5.6 million.

Environmental Challenges and Land Claims: 1970s–1990s

¶79 The Seneca Nation and New York State continued to interact through the 1970s on legislation and environmental issues. The Nation learned about toxic chemical dumping sites near their reservation. Investigations revealed that numerous corporations used the areas of Niagara River Strip, Hyde Park, and Love Canal in Niagara Falls to dispose of toxic chemicals for more than 50 years.

¶80 The Seneca learned about the extent of the dumping and its hazardous effects on the health of surrounding populations, including tribal members. The three Niagara Falls sites appeared so badly contaminated that the situation was termed an “ecological catastrophe” by government officials, who conceded to only partial knowledge of the extent of the contamination in the Erie and Niagara regions.

¶81 The corporations dumped chemicals into the surrounding water, buried toxic chemicals in barrels under clay caps, buried them at landfills, or encased them in steel drums. None of these efforts were sufficient to keep the toxic chemicals from leaching into the soil and water, thus harming the surrounding community. Some of the toxic chemicals were known carcinogens and mutagens, like Agent Orange and other poisons.

¶82 New York State permitted corporate use of the Niagara River Strip for decades under the belief that the state owned the land. New York State acquired the land in an 1802 treaty and had been using and leasing the land for corporate purposes ever since. Corporations wanted the land for their use due to the proximity to Niagara Falls and its ability to create industry on the river.

¶83 The news about the dumping alarmed the Seneca, particularly in reference to the Niagara River Strip, because they felt strongly that the Niagara River Strip still belonged to the tribe. The Seneca insisted that conveyances under the Treaty of 1802 remained invalid because the treaty violated the Non-Intercourse Act. The Non-Intercourse Act was passed in 1790 and amended in 1799, and 1802. As such, to be valid a treaty needed to be ratified by the Senate and proclaimed by the President

181. Abrams, supra note 170, at 100–01.
182. See Berman Draft Manuscript, supra note 38.
183. Id. at 1.
184. Id. at 2.
185. Id. at 2–3.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 1.
188. Id. at 2.
189. See Berman Draft Manuscript, supra note 38.
190. Id. at 1.
191. Id. at 9.
before it could take effect. The Treaty of 1802 did not comply with these requirements. 

¶84 While this fight over land and stewardship raged on, the Seneca received a boon when the Supreme Court ruled in California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, asserting that Tribes retained sovereignty over certain matters of civil jurisdiction. In Cabazon, the Court stated:

In Barona, applying what it thought to be the civil/criminal dichotomy drawn in Bryan v. Itasca County, the Court of Appeals drew a distinction between state “criminal/prohibitory” laws and state “civil/regulatory” laws: if the intent of a state law is generally to prohibit certain conduct, it falls within Pub. L. 280’s grant of criminal jurisdiction, but if the state law generally permits the conduct at issue, subject to regulation, it must be classified as civil/regulatory and Pub. L. 280 does not authorize its enforcement on an Indian reservation. The shorthand test is whether the conduct at issue violates the State’s public policy.

Specifically, the case held that regardless of state regulatory rules, tribes could regulate gambling on their territories.

¶85 This case paved the way for the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. § 2701 et seq., and the creation of the National Indian Gaming Commission in October 1988. With aid from this commission, and its federal oversight of Indian gaming activities, tribes could seize an economic opportunity on a larger scale without as much concern over state involvement. With the prospect of a larger economic opportunity, tribes could consider the prospect of regaining lost lands using some new reserves of capital.

¶86 By this time, however, the 99-year leases were set to expire with no solution in sight. No one could wait for gaming dollars to help resolve the land issue. Members of Congress from New York began crafting a solution that eventually became the SNSA.

¶87 After the SNSA passed, the Seneca Nation continued to challenge New York State’s title claims to other land. After years of litigation and extensive briefing and argument, the U.S. Second Circuit Court of Appeals found for the state in 2004. The court focused on the presumption that when a state acquires land, it cannot be divested of that land through a generous treaty interpretation. The treaty would have to show “beyond reasonable question” that the land at issue was meant for the tribe and not the state.

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192. Id. at 5.
193. Id. at 9.
195. Id. at 209–10.
196. Id.
198. See note 1, supra, and accompanying text.
200. Id. at 259.
201. Id. (quoting United States v. Minnesota, 270 U.S. 181, 209 (1926)).
While the decision felt like a setback, not all was lost. In fact, the Seneca used the money from the SNSA to open a casino in Niagara Falls and operate Class III gaming through a Tribal-State Compact with New York.202

Not everyone appeared happy for the Senecas’ success. In news stories published shortly after the SNSA passed, few people seemed deeply aware of the Seneca land issues in detail.203 Many people seemed to understand that the Seneca owned the land once upon a time, but believed these past events had little or no impact on the present day.204 Moreover, even after the Act passed, residents resisted handing over lease payments and continued to refuse to pay what was owed.205

**Rehabilitating and Restoring the Public Memory by Promoting Archival Spaces**

Residents like those described above are not uncommon. Their gaps in understanding the Senecas’ history reflect a larger tendency: public consciousness often lacks clear detail of the historical path.206 In part, this is explained by our not wanting to remember what is uncomfortable or inconvenient.207 Even attempts to inform ourselves of current events can fall short. Residents, politicians, and even journalists present small anecdotes or sound bites of information that encapsulate such moments.208 But even the most skilled expressions in law or journalism reveal only pieces of truth rather than the whole picture. Few of these moments capture the collective history that frames an entire issue or conflict. Our memories are flawed things, and we cannot always rely on them to provide the fullest historical truth or understanding.209

Archives help provide a bigger picture and enable greater understanding of the law. A prime example comes from the archival recordings of the women’s liberation movement in Great Britain and its impact on legislative change in that country.210 The movement for equality provided archivists with recordings of women’s education, family, work, and day-to-day experiences.211 The women’s liberation movement, and these archives, focused on equal pay for women, equal access to jobs, sexual health, and

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204. Id.
206. See Ketelaar, supra note 29, at 9–11.
207. Id.
208. See Kolbert, supra note 27.
209. Ketelaar, supra note 29, at 12.
211. Id. at 32.
sexuality issues. The recordings give researchers a clear view into the discrimination faced by women as they navigated the legal space for jobs, decent pay, and dignity. But, the recordings also indicate how changes under the laws affected these women's lives. The law before the movement gave women few choices, rendering them second-class citizens. After the movement, some laws gave women more choices, and the recordings reflect the change while noting areas of continued conflict on the civil rights front.

Examples of archival work intersecting with the law are also found in the international arena, such as where tribunals review war crimes and determine how the public should remember atrocities and guard against a recurrence. One example comes from the 1984 Paris Tribunal regarding the Armenian Genocide. The tribunal became one of several examples where international law intersected with what became known as “official history.” In these tribunals, archives played a key role in determining the scope of official history and where and how it impacts international law. Moreover, the tribunals produce a counterhistory to the official history, written from the victor’s perspective.

In the 1984 Paris Tribunal, evidence indicated that not all official documents made it into the official history recorded at the Turkish government archives. Particularly damning pieces of evidence were either destroyed or “lost,” only to be found and produced by witnesses who had preserved the documents against official orders. These documents filled in gaps in the history and reasoning, making the archives more accurate and complete.

The Paris Tribunal impacted international law with its counterhistory archive. Moreover, the tribunal impacted how war crimes are prosecuted under international law. Prosecuting state violations and insisting on the state governmental body making all required reparations became part of the international process for tribunals.

The Paris Tribunal also discussed how archives can serve the people and how they prevent political bodies from engaging in revisionist practices. Archives can provide evidence for later legal proceedings that arise over time. They also serve as a

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212. *Id.*
213. *Id.*
214. *Id.* at 33.
215. *Id.*
216. *Id.*
218. *Id.* at 246.
219. *Id.*
220. *Id.* at 249.
221. *Id.* at 253.
222. *Id.*
223. *Id.* at 253–54.
224. *Id.* at 257–58.
memory space for the oppressed, providing a collection of heritage and a way to share it with a larger community.225

¶96 In his discussion on archives and international law, Abdulqawi Ahmed Yusuf notes that academic use of archives informs the international community, informs international legal theory, and informs the practice of law.226 He notes that the decentralized nature of international law produces a greater role for academic study and legal theory.227 Practitioners often review the archival evidence of customary practices and general principles to inform international law and theory.228

¶97 Archives play a vital role in this work as the archives grow with updates that inform and change customary practices for state actors. Academic study of these changes enables a practitioner to evolve legal theories and the overall practice of law.229

¶98 Yusuf insists that law evolves to address changes in societies, and archival work aids in that overall evolution. Thus, archival work helps extend the reach of existing law and create new law to meet the needs of the people. Yusuf insists that the law must serve the people, a process made possible only when laws evolve. Thus, legal theorists must “identify, propose, and effect changes” in legal theory and practice to ensure the growth and evolution of law that serves the people. Without archives, we cannot achieve these steps.230

¶99 Legal archives, or those memory spaces by which we record laws and their changes, aid researchers in understanding the legal landscape across time and how it impacts the community. Creating a legal archive and formatting that archive can shape the memory of the law and how it evolves over time. In short, the archive as a memory space helps crystalize what we know about the law and how we understand it.231

¶100 An archive contains traces of legal memory, like legal writing and draft legislation, but it also impacts future interpretations and how researchers will note any process of legal evolution.232 That is because archives show us the relationship between memory and justice.233 Justice requires that we do not forget what has come before.234 To successfully find justice, we must strive for it and seek it out.235 To that end, we must remember the law and its impacts on communities who lack a voice in the main

225. Id. at 250–51.
227. Id. at 604.
228. Id. at 604–05.
229. Id. at 605.
230. Id. at 612.
233. Id. at 260.
234. Id.
235. Id.
political arena. Law attempts to represent justice, but it cannot do so with inadequate memory. We need archives to aid our memory and instantiate justice.

¶101 To better represent justice, writes Campbell, our laws must bear witness to the losses and injuries of the disenfranchised, the oppressed, and the voiceless. Laws must evolve as our notion of justice evolves. Archives enable us to bear witness in this way and make it possible to legislate and litigate accordingly.

¶102 Recall Ketelaar’s point that archives represent living records that inform our flawed memories. Archival spaces try to collect everything they can on an issue, event, or person. Archives try to avoid curating only the good stuff and work to provide the fullest history without a veneer. Each item curated, and each use of the item, becomes part of the record. As the record evolves, its strength of memory increases. The archive serves as a communal memory, a place where our collective memory can be renewed and restored. In some ways, with guidance, archives can help us avoid the revisionism of our history that allows us to forget inconvenient truths.

¶103 Moreover, archives possess “instrumental, institutional, and intrinsic value.” According to Ian Richards, archives are instrumental based on their impact on the culture of our society. They are committed to the public they serve. Further, archives possess intrinsic value in the nature of their work and how it evolves as our history evolves.

¶104 Although archives serve the community, this service is not defined simply by geographic borders. According to Richards, communities are defined by common elements of social groups with boundaries discerned by perceptions and activities. This creates a space where archives serve a larger, more amorphous community that evolves as the archives evolve. With increased technology and globalization, archives can serve a broader community on a larger scale.

¶105 But, this change of perception does not alter the mission to create a memory space that informs our collective consciousness. In fact, this perception of a global community makes the mission of a memory space more precious than before. Notably, Ketelaar sees this tension when comparing legal proceedings to archival reviews. The questions arise, what is truth, and when do we find it? Ketelaar insists that the search for truth does not stop at the end of a proceeding; truth, as a living concept, continually engages archivists and whole communities. Ketelaar also understands that such an

236. Id.
237. Id. at 261.
238. Id.
239. Id.
242. Id. at 17–18.
243. Id. at 21.
244. Id. at 21–22.
understanding of truth can create tension between who will establish a “whole” picture and who will keep the information and protect it. But Ketelaar insists that archives are both open spaces and spaces of memory. They are never “closed” or finished and, as such, they act as keepers of living information that serve as a collective memory space for community.246

¶106 Additionally, this concept of a living truth raises tensions around the manipulation of information and whether archives can operate as memory spaces in the face of such potential issues, including whether any memory can be complete or whether any archive can be “finished,” “complete,” or “whole” in any way to achieve that fullest truth. When do we stop collecting? Whose truth is the most accurate and how do we collect it and protect it? When does the collection and protection begin to look like a manipulation of the history and truth that people knew before? When and how do you engage the community to make a fuller and more accurate accounting of memory and truth? Ketelaar insists that archivists play a great role in the face of this pressure not to be perceived as manipulators by acting as liberators of records and information to an extent that they cannot be destroyed and minority voices become silenced as part of history.247 Richards agrees with this principle and notes that specific archives can provide a space to preserve information from manipulation or destruction when archivists act as gatekeepers to what exists in the archives and how access is managed. That said, Richards also notes that archivists must invite further community engagement to create broader community spaces and continue their efforts to remain a cornerstone of community in a larger sense.248

¶107 Ketelaar, Richards, and others conclude that the goals of expanding our global community, and serving that community with access and collaboration, are worth fighting for despite these issues.249 Maintaining this mission and the communities served by archives becomes more complex as our society evolves.250

¶108 Richards notes that archives must be seen as a cornerstone of the community to successfully maintain them and serve the community. Restated, it becomes necessary to engage the community and reeducate individuals on the archives and their uses. Establishing that constant contact and continued communication can improve understanding of the archives’ holdings and uses.251

¶109 Ketelaar suggests that archives can achieve these objectives by engaging online with the community to create online records, digital storytelling, and greater access. Creating or developing an archival space that is geared toward an online, interactive community can yield tremendous rewards. But it also presents challenges with

246. Id. at 11–13.
247. Id. at 14–17.
248. Richards, supra note 241, at 74–76, 80–82.
249. Ketelaar, supra note 29, at 20–21; Richards, supra note 241, at 80–82.
251. Id. at 36.
provenance and requires new policy drafting that addresses the unique challenges created from using new technology.252

¶110 Richards makes additional suggestions for archives becoming a cornerstone of a community. He suggests engaging with historians and researchers to participate in specific ways that lobby for education about an archives’ uses and its mission. Formal letters of support, social media, and participation in events can provide archives with an additional platform for reeducation. Further, creating dialogue around difficult topics and historical events can provide archives and parts of the community with a space to develop greater understanding of each other, the archives’ subjects, and themselves.253

¶111 Creating this dialogue or developing digital histories adds to the archives and creates “living documents” as described by Ketelaar. In addition, reaching out to parts of the community to develop this dialogue solidifies the archives as a cornerstone of the community as suggested by Richards. These discussions create and develop awareness, and that awareness becomes part of the community identity.254

¶112 Archival spaces can contribute to the community by means of engagement, collection and development of community history, personal stories, and reestablished connections to places and groups.255 Archives as a memory space and a cornerstone of the community can be a place where histories intersect and overlap.256 Archives balance histories and provide us with fuller knowledge of those histories.257 These services are key to education and government policy development.258 They fill in the gaps of our knowledge, they inform us, they engage with us, they spur greater understanding, and they evolve as we do. They rescue pieces of our memory that we have lost.259 Without them, we are left with only our own fallible memories, and much of what is important becomes lost to time.

¶113 To preserve, protect, and support our archival spaces, we need to make a compelling case for doing so. Doing this successfully could require getting professionals across disciplines to liaise on collections and concur on preservation and access issues.260 It could also require communicating across disciplines on the meaning of an artifact and how best to balance competing preservation versus conservation issues for the use and development of the community.261

253. Richards, supra note 241, at 40, 42.
254. Id. at 42–43.
255. Id. at 44.
256. Id. at 46.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 58–60.
261. Id. at 15–16. To conserve is typically meant to focus on keeping materials in a way that prevents physical damage. This can sometimes lead to limited access to materials. Preservation, on the other hand, focuses on reducing damage to increase the life expectancy of materials. This focus arguably places
Moreover, developing our archival spaces as spaces of collective memory requires digitization techniques that advance those goals. Updating the technology used in an archival space, and the means by which we see an archival space, enables us to learn from our past. To increase access and storage, portable hard drives, ultra-dense optical media, holographic storage, and mega-dense tape cartridges can provide storage and access solutions.262

Increasing these technological options can lead to creating memory spaces that function with greater access to reach a broader community. These options can enable archivists to meet the needs of their communities with greater flexibility and ensure the archive they protect is better understood.

Conclusion

In sum, archives serve as cornerstones of community and spaces of collective memory. They serve as a more complete memory of our past and give context to the present, in a way that our fallible memories cannot. A more complete archival memory space impacts its community and history as the community engages with it and refines it. Librarians wishing to improve their relationship with their community should consider creating an archival memory space as a means to further access to information and engage the community in the concept of information completion. Gathering oral histories and memories of an important event in the community can be one of many examples where information professionals begin the work of creating a memory space. Gathering community art, poetry, and recordings on an event or law can be another way to reach out and build the space. Further research is needed to establish the most successful ways to build memory spaces with the right tools. Yet, even now, we can proceed with creating those spaces and engaging with the world around us to preserve and protect community memories. Indeed, it is the work of these memory spaces that enables us as information professionals to better preserve the history and the memory that we protect. As information professionals, we promote access to information, but that access is only as good as what we have on hand to provide to our community. Creating memory spaces enables us to provide access to more information than ever before. It enables us to provide a more complete, more nuanced picture of events than before. It enables us to hone the image of the library as a cornerstone of the community. Memories do not live in brick and mortar buildings. They endure beyond the cement, and stone, and time, provided we preserve them. So, too, our libraries can become memory spaces enduring beyond brick and stone. They can stand the test of time, as long as we think creatively about how they, and we, evolve and maintain their role in the community. The history around the SNSA and what led up to it offers a prime

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example of how our history can get distorted or lost without an archival dig for understanding. It appears that few fully understood the history behind the land issues they meant to solve by passing the SNSA. Even after the Act’s passage, few seemed willing to remember any of the history that once favored the Seneca in any meaningful way. This is exactly why archives are so important.

¶117 Archives limit our ability to revise history and remove uncomfortable truths. Archives also enable us to create spaces of living memory that grow richer with each use. But, maintaining this role requires understanding, education, and technology. Understanding is needed to ensure that archives continue to maintain their role as a cornerstone in the community. Education is needed to see how archives inform us and protect our history. Technology updates are needed to ensure that these goals are maintained.
Exhibit A
Timeline of Events

1777
- United States Articles of Confederation
- Treaty of Fort Stanwix

1781
- Non-Intercourse Act

1784
- Interstate Compact Between NY and MA

1786
- Treaty of Canandaigua

1790
- Treaty of Big Tree

1794
- Non-Intercourse Act (amended again 1793)

1797
- Robert Morris and Holland Land Company Purchase

1799
- Treaty of 1802

1802
- Non-Intercourse Act (amend)

1810
- Holland Land Co. sale to Ogden

1813
- Treaty of 1813

1821
- Seneca Nation Land Act

1826
- Treaty of 1826
- Menominee Treaty of 1832

1832
- Treaty of 1838

1838
- Treaty of 1842

1842
- Whipple Report

1875
- Everett Commencement Report

1915
- Seneeca Nation v. US (1915)

1922
- Everett Commencement Report

1942
- US v. Farriss

1948
- 25 USC 232

1950
- Kinzua Dam condemnation

1977
- CA v. Cabazon (1987)

1987-8
- Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (1988)

1990
- Class III Gaming Compact between the Seneca Nation of Indians and the State of New York

2003
- Seneca Nation Settlement Act

2004
- Seneca Nation v. NY

1965
- Kinzua Dam area flooded and hundreds left without homes

1967
- Seneca Nation v. US (1967)
Exhibit B
Maps, 1797–1804


Emily Marcum**

Selected statutes from the U.S.C.S. and the U.S.C.A. were paired and 9164 total case annotations were examined. Of those, 6748 annotations were unique to their publication. All data was analyzed using the Wilcoxon T test for two related samples. The U.S.C.S. and the U.S.C.A. had significantly different case annotations.

Introduction

¶1 There are two choices for annotated versions of the United States Code in print. The version published by West Publishing is the *United States Code Annotated*, or U.S.C.A., and the version published by Lexis Publishing is the *United States Code Service*, or U.S.C.S. Many law libraries, especially academic ones, carry copies of each, historically because they are thought to have different annotations. But which set should the researcher choose? Should the researcher use both? Should libraries continue to subscribe to both?

¶2 Only the rare library today can afford to purchase everything it wants (or even needs). Carrying both versions in print is a significant expense. The U.S.C.A. costs

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* © Emily Marcum, 2021.

** Branch Librarian, 10th Circuit Court of Appeals, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. This research was completed when I worked at Faulkner University Jones School of Law Library. I would like to thank Travis Chin, Lydia Lake, and Alex Hagelston, my student workers who helped compile this data. I would also like to give thanks to Faulkner University for supporting this research. This research was completed before I was hired by the federal judiciary and should not be construed as a governmental opinion or endorsement of any particular brand of reference material over another.
$23,285 initially\(^1\) and requires annual supplements at additional cost. The U.S.C.S. is significantly cheaper at an initial price of $6,119,\(^2\) but also with additional cost every year thereafter.

\(\S 3\) Scholarly comparisons between the two codes are rare. The most recent published paper that I could locate was from 1982 and gave a qualitative analysis of the content of each code.\(^3\) I did find one paper comparing Bloomberg’s electronic “Smart Code” with the U.S.C.S. and the U.S.C.A. using a number of research problems to compare results.\(^4\) However, that paper has not yet been published. The paper did confirm the lack of other scholarly works on point by citing only to the 1982 paper and noting the curious lack of others.\(^5\) However, when it comes to quantitative analysis of each print code, sources are sparse. The latest edition of *Fundamentals of Legal Research* writes simply, “the U.S.C.A. contains more annotations than the U.S.C.S.”\(^6\) Meanwhile, *Legal Research in a Nutshell* states,

> You may need to check both USCA and USCS for thorough research of a particular statute. Each has selective annotations of court decisions, and a relevant case may be included in one but not the other. USCA’s annotations are generally more extensive, but some court decisions appear only in USCS—which is also the only source for administrative decisions.\(^7\)

\(\S 4\) This article is intended to be a large dataset quantitative analysis of the two codes’ case annotations in the notes of decisions. I have not used research problems to select which statutes to compare. Instead, I have selected statutes by allowing the book to fall open to them so that I would not know in advance which statute would be picked.

\(\S 5\) My hope is that this analysis will guide researchers in picking which annotated code to start with. I also hope that this study will help library administrators give definitive numerical answers to the questions “Why should the library buy both versions of the code?” and “Are the two versions of the code really that different?”

**Methods**

\(\S 6\) I wanted to pick statutes to compare that are relatively distanced within the code, and I wanted to choose them in as close to a random methodology as possible.

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5. Id. at 2.
Therefore, I decided to pick one statute per volume of the U.S.C.S. by allowing the volume to fall open and using the statute listed on the page it fell open to. If the book fell open to a statute that did not have any case annotations, then I went forward one page at a time until I reached the first statute with annotations. I chose statutes even if they had an exceptionally large number of case annotations to prevent picking and choosing which statutes I wanted. Then I compared the exact same statute from the U.S.C.A.

\[7\] This method of choosing has the advantage of picking statutes without regard to a specific, preconceived research problem. However, one drawback to this method is that sometimes print books can have spines creased to open to their most popular contents. Therefore, this method of selection cannot be considered perfectly random, except that I did not know in advance which statutes would be chosen.

\[8\] I continued with this method until I had reached more than 5000 case annotations in the first set. If the sets had roughly the same number of annotations, I reasoned, stopping when one set had more than 5000 would result in a total of approximately 10,000 case annotations. As it turned out, I stopped when I reached 5059 case annotations in the U.S.C.A., and I wound up having 9164 total case annotations.

\[9\] For the entire experiment, I used 2018 pocket parts for both the U.S.C.S. and the U.S.C.A. For each statute, I had student workers fill out a table of case annotations (see table 1 for an example of a completed statute table; all other completed statute tables are available upon e-mailing the author). To fill out the tables, I gave my student researchers blank tables for each statute and a printed instruction sheet with nine steps and one special instruction, as seen in the appendix following the article.

\[10\] In summary, their instructions were to go to the U.S.C.S. statute I assigned and enter the title and citation of all cases in alphabetical order for both the main volume and the pocket part. Then they were to go to the U.S.C.A. and, for all cases, check to see whether the annotations were present in the U.S.C.S. or not, and then come up with a count of total case annotations for both the U.S.C.S. and U.S.C.A., and also a total count of how many case annotations were found in only one or the other. In this manner, we came up with four different numbers for each statute: U.S.C.S. total case annotations, U.S.C.S. unique case annotations, U.S.C.A. total case annotations, and U.S.C.A. unique case annotations.

\[11\] My student workers and I looked only at case annotations and not annotations to treatises or other commentary because the cases are judicial opinions and are thus publisher-neutral, whereas there might be an incentive for a publisher to cite to only its own line of treatises or commentaries. Thus, a researcher might expect both codes to share a similar selection of case annotations but not to share the same treatise annotations. Also, by looking only at case annotations, we had the time and funding to compare a larger number of statutes than if we had counted all annotations of any kind.

\[12\] One area where this methodology becomes complicated, however, is with administrative “case” annotations. U.S.C.S. includes administrative case annotations and U.S.C.A. does not. Administrative case annotations meet the criteria for selection in that they are publisher-neutral government publications that a researcher might be looking for. Not including them would make the U.S.C.S. appear to have fewer
annotations than it actually has, whereas including administrative cases would seem to penalize the U.S.C.A. for not including them. In the end, I decided to include administrative case annotations because they are publisher-neutral, government information that both codes could have included if they so desired. While administrative case annotations were not a large percentage of the overall count, it is important to be aware of this difference when evaluating the results.

**Choice of Inferential Statistics Models**

¶ 13 In a perfect world, with infinite amounts of time and funding, a researcher could count every single case annotation in both the U.S.C.S. and U.S.C.A. for all statutes. That would represent the entire population of case annotations. However, because we do not have infinite time, we instead drew a sample of case annotations from each. Inferential statistics is the process of inferring from a sample the characteristics of a whole population:

> For us to draw accurate conclusions about a population, a sample must be “representative” of that population. In a representative sample, the characteristics of the sample reflect the characteristics of the population . . . . Whether a sample is representative depends on how we select the sample. From a statistical standpoint, the most important aspect of creating representative samples is random sampling.8

¶ 14 In essence, we want to know whether our sample is representative of the population, and inferential statistics help us to decide whether a sample is close enough to what we predict we would find in a full population or whether we should reject our prediction of what the population looks like. In this article, our hypothesis about the population is that case annotations in the U.S.C.S. and the U.S.C.A. are not significantly different from each other. “Significant describes results that are too unlikely to accept as resulting from chance sampling error when the predicted relationship does not exist; it indicates rejection on the null hypothesis.”9

¶ 15 Put in other words, it is not enough to take a sample of case annotations from each publication and say that one publication has more than the other. We want to know whether the two numbers are so different that we cannot believe that the two publications have equivalent numbers of annotations. To do this, we need to test our sample using inferential statistics.

¶ 16 There are two types of inferential statistics: parametric and nonparametric. “Parametric statistics are procedures that require certain assumptions about the raw score populations being represented . . . . Nonparametric procedures are inferential procedures that do not require such stringent assumptions about the parameters of the populations represented by the sample . . . .”10

9. Id. at 530.
10. Id. at 249.
¶17 The most widely used matched pair inferential statistical model is the related samples \( t \) test. “Related samples occur when we pair each score in one sample with a particular score in the other sample.”\(^{11}\) Here, we are matching a U.S.C.S. statute with the same statute in the U.S.C.A. However, the related samples \( t \) test statistical model was not well suited for this study because the related samples \( t \) test assumes a normal population distribution.\(^{12}\) That is because it is a parametric inferential statistic. In this case, we have no reason to suspect that the full population of case annotations follows a normal bell curve. Therefore, I did not use the related samples \( t \) test to analyze the data.

¶18 I was tempted to choose the Cohen’s Kappa model because it measures rater agreement. In other words, since both codes are made by human editors, I could have used Cohen’s Kappa to measure the amount of agreement between editors when deciding which cases to include in their annotations. In this statistical model, results are expressed between zero and one, where zero means any rater agreement is due entirely to chance and one indicates perfect agreement between raters.\(^{13}\) The problem is that there is no widely accepted agreement about which value between zero and one should be considered “statistically significant.” Due to this lack of scientific agreement over which value is statistically significant, I rejected this statistical model in favor of one with clearer standards for significance.

¶19 Thus, I chose the Wilcoxon \( T \) test for two related samples because it allows for a nonnormal distribution and a lack of random assignment, and it has an agreed-upon standard for significance. “The Wilcoxon \( T \) test is the nonparametric equivalent of the related samples \( t \)-test for ranks.”\(^{14}\) That is why it does not require a normal distribution (that is, it does not require a population that follows a normal bell curve).

¶20 I ran the Wilcoxon \( T \) test twice. The first test was to decide whether the total annotations in the U.S.C.A. were significantly different from the total annotations in the U.S.C.S. The second time I ran the test to decide whether the total number of unique annotations in the U.S.C.A. were significantly different from the total number of unique annotations in the U.S.C.S.

Results

¶21 We counted annotations for 23 different statutes (see table 3). From this, I analyzed 5059 annotations in the U.S.C.A., of which 3852 were unique to the U.S.C.A. I analyzed 4105 annotations in the U.S.C.S., of which 2896 were unique to the U.S.C.S. Expressed as percentages, 76 percent of case annotations in the U.S.C.A. were unique to the U.S.C.A., and 70.5 percent of the case annotations in the U.S.C.S. were unique to the U.S.C.S. (see figures 1 and 2). These results reflect a much greater lack of overlap than expected.
I ran the Wilcoxon $T$ test for two related samples twice, once to determine whether the total annotations were significantly different in each set and once to determine whether the sets had significantly different numbers of unique case annotations. Two of the statutes analyzed had difference scores of 0 on both tests, therefore they dropped out of the analysis both times and thus both times I proceeded with $N=21$. The critical value of $T$ when $N=21$ is 58. Both times I ran the Wilcoxon $T$ I obtained a $T$ value of 50. Because 50 is less than 58, both tests were significant. Therefore, we can say that the U.S.C.A. and the U.S.C.S. have a significantly different total number of case annotations, and we can also say that the U.S.C.A. and the U.S.C.S. have a significantly different number of unique case annotations as well.

### Conclusion

Because both of our inferential statistics tests were significant, we can reject the hypothesis that the U.S.C.S. and the U.S.C.A. offer the same selection of case annotations. Instead, we can say that the case annotations given are significantly different from each other. Put differently, there is a significant amount of non-overlap between the case annotations offered by one set and those offered by the other.

Law libraries often buy both sets of annotated codes because law librarians have historically thought the two sets different. This study confirms that. However, it is still surprising that the percentages of unique annotations were so high: 76 percent of annotations being unique to the U.S.C.A. and 70.5 percent being unique to the U.S.C.S. is much higher than I expected it to be. Given such a high percentage of diversity between

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### TABLE 1

Sample Statute Annotations: 5 U.S.C.S. § 7111

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Citation</th>
<th>In U.S.C.A.?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AFGE v. Loy</td>
<td>367 F.3d 932</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baird v. Holway</td>
<td>539 F. Supp. 2d 79</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eisinger v. FLRA</td>
<td>218 F.3d 1097</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. King</td>
<td>961 F.2d 240</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ry. Mail Ass’n v. Corsi</td>
<td>326 U.S. 88</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

### TABLE 2


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Citation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Local 2441 v. FLRA</td>
<td>864 F.2d 178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Dep’t of Defense v. FLRA</td>
<td>114 S. Ct. 1006</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Total Case Annotations U.S.C.S.: 5         |            |
| Unique to U.S.C.S.: 2                      |            |
| Total Case Annotations U.S.C.A.: 5         |            |
| Unique to U.S.C.A.: 2                      |            |
the two, a researcher may be well served by examining both sets when starting research. Libraries should continue to buy both sets despite the cost burden, if possible.

§25 Another surprising finding is that the literature has led us to believe that U.S.C.A. contains more annotations than U.S.C.S.,\textsuperscript{15} and an examination of table 3 shows that only 3 of the 23 statutes had more annotations in U.S.C.A. However, counting the total number of annotations together across the sample gives the U.S.C.A. an advantage of 954 cases. Put differently, in only 3 of the 23 cases was the U.S.C.A. a more thorough resource, but in those 3 cases where it was different it was so thorough that it

\textsuperscript{15} Barkan et al., supra note 6, at 147.
Figure 1
Percentage of Annotations Unique to U.S.C.A.

USCA
- Annotations found in both publications
- Annotations found in only the USCA

Figure 2
Percentage of Annotations Unique to U.S.C.S.

USCS
- Annotations found in both publications
- Annotations found in only the USCS
came out on top by 954 despite having fewer annotations in 20 of the surveyed statutes.

Appendix: Student Instructions

Step 1: Go to U.S.C.S. statute assigned; write down title and citation in columns 1 and 2. There are many parallel citations, but you need to write down only one. Leave column 3 blank for now. For the next citation, either insert a row above or below, based on alphabetization. All titles need to be in alphabetical order or the next steps will be more difficult. Repeat until all citations for this statute are listed.

Step 2: Check pocket part for more U.S.C.S. citations to the statute and, if therein, repeat step 1 for all. If there are no citations in the pocket part, go on to step 3.

Step 3: Go to the same statute in the U.S.C.A. Check each citation to see if it is listed in the U.S.C.S. list that you just completed in table 1 (alphabetical order makes this much faster). If it is listed in both places, put “yes” in column 3. If it is listed only in the U.S.C.A., then fill out the title and citation in the “Unique to U.S.C.A. table,” which is table 2. Repeat until all citations for this statute are either marked “yes” or listed in table 2.

Step 4: Check pocket part for more U.S.C.A. citations to the statute and, if there are, repeat step 3 for all. If there are no citations in the pocket part, go to step 5.

Step 5: For any citation in table 1 that is not marked “yes” in column 3, shade the row red using the “table design” tab and the shading button.

Step 6: Count the total number of citations from the U.S.C.S. and list at the bottom of the page.

Step 7: Count the total number of citations unique to the U.S.C.S. and list at the bottom of the page. This number is the same number as the number of red columns you have shaded in step 3.

Step 8: Count the total number of citations from the U.S.C.A. and list at the bottom of the page. This number is calculated by adding the number of “yeses” in column 3 plus the total rows in table 2.

Step 9: Count the number of citations unique to the U.S.C.A. and list at the bottom of the page. This number is the same as the number of rows in table 2.

Special instructions: Watch out for the difference between “U.S. v. Jane” and “Jane v. U.S.” If this is a simple appeal of a case, do not list it as a unique citation. Only list it
as unique if none of the citation numbers match and KeyCite reveals that it is not an appeal of a previously cited case. If a citation says “criticized by” in front of it, then list it as a separate citation. Do not list it as a separate citation if it has other signals in front of it such as “ovrld” or “superseded by statute on other grounds,” etc. Therefore, the only signal that gets its own citation list is “criticized by.”
Keeping Up with New Legal Titles∗

Compiled by Susan Azyndar∗∗ and Susan David deMaine∗∗∗

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¶1 Modern Legal Scholarship: A Guide to Producing and Publishing Scholarly and Professional Writing piqued my interest for two reasons. First, as a faculty member with library administration duties, discussions of scholarship occur all around me in the library. Students regularly come to the library to discuss the potential of and process for getting their upper-level writing requirement papers published, and faculty reach out for advanced research assistance for their scholarship. Moreover, the scholarship expectations of law librarians today have become a focus of conversation in the profession. Second, I have always respected one of the authors, Elizabeth McCurry Johnson, a former academic law librarian.

¶2 This collaborative, task-orientated work boasts four authors: Christine Coughlin and Sandy Patrick, who both currently serve as law professors; Mathew Houston, a practicing attorney who served as the student editor for his alma mater’s flagship law review; and Elizabeth McCurry Johnson, former law librarian and professor, who in recent years has returned to private practice. This work is drafted as a how-to guide for a reader looking for significant and practical advice on the writing process, which can often become overwhelming and daunting to a novice. The book explores the nature of scholarship from the initial foundation or spark of an idea through the writing to the end result of a final piece of published self-expression. A host of varied examples, step-by-step recommendations, and practical suggestions are richer because of the authors’ different relationships to the legal publishing process.

¶3 Modern Legal Scholarship presents helpful information on multiple forms of scholarly writing. One excellent chapter discusses writing law review and journal articles, including how to craft a strong title for your law review. The other types of scholarly writing thoroughly explored in the text include seminar and white papers, capstone projects,
bar journal articles, creative works, op-eds, and more modern academic scholarly writing in blogs and social media platforms.

4 Additionally, the authors address the article submission process. Some think the process is more of an art, while others believe it is more of a science. Some may find the process “dirty,” as authors game their way up the rankings ladder. Whatever opinion is held about the submission process, this text does a great job of walking the reader through a straightforward three-question approach for submitting a work to any potential publisher. To be successful, an author needs to know where to publish, how to submit, and when to submit. The authors help hopeful student writers navigate these questions. For example, the authors recommend the student’s law school review or journal as the first place to consider submitting work, even if the student is not a member of the particular journal as some school’s review guidelines allow for open submissions. Next, the authors recommend considering submitting the work to other law schools’ journals or reviews if the student’s background is unique and the drafted article meets or exceeds the criteria laid out for professional authors. Finally, the authors recommend the student consider publishing in a specialty journal if he or she has a specific level of expertise and establishes a strong interest in the subject area of the journal’s specialization. In the end, any legal writer who follows the tips and recommendations of the authors and answers their three questions will find the hard work done. After that, it is just a waiting game for the acceptance email. It is worth noting that this book is a 2020 publication, so there is some discussion about ExpressO, which no longer exists as a submission platform.

5 Modern Legal Scholarship is a very straightforward and accessible book for any potential legal scholar. Its pages are filled with practical advice and instruction for novice to experienced writers. I was glad to add it to our library collection and recommend this book for library collections focusing on titles that provide more practical and skills-based resources than theory.

6 It would also be a great textbook for a multiweek workshop or course in support of the advanced writing requirement. These companion courses for the writing requirement have gained popularity, and often they do not have a required or recommended text. This book fills that void.


Reviewed by Nariné Bournoutian*

7 Although many would agree that service is a core tenet of librarianship, service lacks a single or simple definition. Recognizing this complexity, Deconstructing Service in Libraries: Intersections of Identities and Expectations is a collection of works that examines the concept of service in libraries, its complex history, and the various ways in which it is shaped by social forces and personal identities.

8 As the editors note in their introduction, no service interaction exists in a vacuum. Each is influenced by the context and the individuals involved, all of which are inseparable from systems of power. These essays explore the relationships between power and service in librarianship, ways to overcome oppressive structures in service interactions, and methods to ensure staff well-being given the emotional labor inherent in service work.

9 The collection consists of 19 chapters by different authors, all of whom serve as library workers, and all but one in academic libraries. The first of two sections, “Intersecting Identities and Service,” examines different aspects of library workers’ identities and how they shape service practices, as well as the emotional and mental tolls of providing service. The second section, “Reworking the Concept of Service in Libraries,” explores how current practices and ideas of service can be transformed into a framework to empower library workers and dismantle existing harmful systems for the benefit of both patrons and staff. However, the majority of the chapters address both of these concepts to some degree, and it was hard to see a delineation between the two sections. This did not hinder the strength of the individual essays, even if the book’s structure was somewhat unclear.

10 Fourteen of the chapters dissect and expand on academic theories of service and intersectionality and how these theories manifest in libraries. These chapters include literature reviews, and often autoethnographic reflections from the writers supplement the discussion. Five of the essays also feature original research or case studies. Noteworthy examples include “DisService: Disabled Library Staff and Service Expectations,” by Kelsey George, which includes a survey of library workers who identify as disabled; and “Shared Service in the Archives: The Johns Hopkins University First-Generation Students Oral History Project,” by Jennifer Kinniff and Annie Tang, which documents an oral history project by archivists at Johns Hopkins University.

11 The writing styles vary among the essays. In addition to the predominantly academic writing style, the book is interspersed with personal reflections from the authors, such as transcript excerpts from anonymous interview subjects in “The Weight of Service: Librarianship and Mental Health,” by Siân Evans. One chapter, “Uneven Expectations: Gender, Whiteness, and the Wobbly Tripod,” by Hailley Fargo, Chelsea Heinbach, and Charissa Powell, is presented entirely in a conversational style among the authors to reflect the informal reality of their ongoing work and the way many library workers share their experiences with colleagues. These breaks from the scholarly style exemplify how the theories in Deconstructing Service in Libraries are realized in daily situations and in the personal experiences of different library workers. Indeed, even in chapters without these direct breaks, nearly every author offers personal anecdotes to supplement their arguments. Given that many of the essays highlight the systemic power imbalances in librarianship and academia, autoethnography was emphasized to balance out surveys and empirical data, offering perspectives underrepresented in scholarly research. Many subjects, such as mental health, burnout, and discrimination, are harder to measure and quantify in research due to
their highly individual nature; sharing feelings, experiences, and opinions is therefore a necessary tool this book deploys effectively.

¶12 The various authors often acknowledge a distinct absence of nonlibrarian library workers in past literature on this topic, a particularly glaring oversight given how often these staff members bear the brunt of emotional labor in service interactions. Some of the chapters do excellent work filling that gap. For example, “DisService” describes how surveys through ALA or other professional organizations are usually limited to a sample who can afford or are reimbursed for membership fees. “Access Services: Not Waving But Drowning” notes the absence of research on nonlibrarian access services workers and the necessity of focusing the chapter on personal experiences as a result.

¶13 Deconstructing Service in Libraries is recommended for academic law librarians interested in critical thought and reflection on the nature of service in their profession and their institution. It is also recommended for anyone with an interest in intersectionality in librarianship. The book is suitable for any level of expertise and knowledge on these subjects. Summaries of preliminary works in literature reviews provide a cursory overview of these academic theories for those who are unfamiliar with them, as well as a wealth of citations for additional reading. In addition, the essays provide enough critical analyses and expansions on these ideas to be interesting for readers already well versed in them. Recommended for academic libraries, both law-specific and general.


Reviewed by SaraJean Petite

¶14 “You have the right to remain silent. Anything you say can and will be used against you in a court of law.” The American legal system did not always give criminal suspects the right to remain silent, as embodied in this now familiar statement. In the fascinating, well-researched Five Words that Changed America: Miranda v. Arizona and the Right to Remain Silent, University of Utah law professors Amos Guiora and Louisa Heiny tell the story of Miranda v. Arizona, the case that brought us the Miranda warning. The story unfolds over seven parts, beginning with the initial criminal case and ending with the impact of the case on its major players.

¶15 In part 1, the authors provide detailed accounts of the crimes Miranda committed: kidnapping and rape of one woman, robbery of a second woman, and attempted robbery of a third woman. They describe how, without probable cause to arrest Miranda, the police solicited a confession as well as permission to search his car, where they found the evidence needed to convict him of the rape. Because of conflicting accounts, the authors rely almost entirely on primary sources, such as police reports

...
and court transcripts, and on interviews with people who were involved contemporaneously.

¶16 The second part charts the development of areas of law on which Miranda had a significant impact. The authors discuss the Supreme Court’s power to say what the law is, along with emancipation, citizenship, due process, and the right to vote. The authors focus on the evolution of due process, a key concept in Miranda’s case, tracing the history of due process in the criminal law context, from statements that mob rule and beating suspects are not due process to the establishment of affirmative rights beginning with a right to counsel, if requested; then a right to counsel in capital cases; and finally a right to counsel in all criminal cases.

¶17 Part 3 returns to Miranda’s case. Here, the authors discuss the legal climate: to convict a rapist, the victim had to resist the rapist, not have been “promiscuous,” and not be married to the rapist. Within this climate, the strategies Miranda’s defense lawyer used at trial played a starring role. In a chapter entitled “Objection of a Lifetime,” the authors trace the trial’s turning point to an objection regarding the confession because Miranda was not told he had the right to counsel. Although not an entirely accurate statement of legal requirements at the time, this objection made it possible to appeal the case on that issue. Without that objection, the Supreme Court never would have heard the appeal.

¶18 The appeal takes center stage in part 4. Here we meet the legal team the ACLU hired for Miranda: John Paul Frank, a scholar, and John Flynn, a prominent litigation attorney. Chief Justice Warren was looking for cases to expand Escobedo v. Illinois, a case interpreting the Sixth Amendment to require police to honor a suspect’s request to speak to a lawyer. Miranda’s case was one of four with the fact pattern Chief Justice Warren sought, and multiple Justices selected it as one they wanted to hear. The authors skillfully describe the arguments in the parties’ briefs and oral arguments, revealing how what was originally a Sixth Amendment right to counsel case became a Fifth Amendment self-incrimination case. This part concludes with an explanation of the decision-writing process and how the Chief Justice secured the necessary support for his views, ultimately requiring the police to give the Miranda warning.

¶19 After the successful appeal, the case was retried, as described in the book’s fifth part. The defense counted on winning because, in light of the Supreme Court’s opinion, the prosecution could not use the confession or the evidence obtained as a result of the confession. The prosecution was able to secure a guilty verdict, however, because Miranda had told his girlfriend what he had done, and she testified at the trial.

¶20 Parts 6 and 7 relate what happened in the aftermath of the Miranda litigation. Miranda became somewhat famous in prison, and he developed a very strong sense of self-importance. After he was released, he had run-ins with the criminal justice system, and he was eventually murdered in a bar fight. Chief Justice Warren became unpopular, and he faced calls for impeachment. The officers who arrested Miranda felt their actions had been misrepresented, and police departments had to consider the effects

that the Court’s decision would have on their day-to-day operations. The authors also
detail the subsequent careers of the lawyers and law clerks involved.

¶21 The book also contains two appendixes: the full text of *Miranda v. Arizona* and
a chapter-by-chapter list of rich source material. As mentioned above, this book relies
heavily on primary source material such as police reports and court transcripts. Later
chapters’ sources include court opinions, other scholarly works, and websites. Each
website includes a perma.cc link, so the reader will always have access to the Internet
sources.

¶22 *Five Words the Changed America* reads like a novel. The authors introduce the
people involved in the case and give the reader a sense of their personalities. They
explain the legal issues and the litigation process in a way nonlawyers can understand.
The layout of the book makes it easy to read, with short chapters and plenty of illustra-
tions of people, places, and documents related to the case. While this book is accessible
to people with no legal background, the meticulous research behind it makes it an
excellent source for anyone interested in learning more about Miranda’s case. This book
would be a good addition to the collections of academic law libraries and the legal col-
clections of university libraries and public libraries.

Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books, 2020. 373p. $120.

Reviewed by Louis M. Rosen*

¶23 I have been obsessed with music my entire life, so as an evolving scholar of
popular culture and the law, I was thrilled to discover another legal writer equally
obsessive about music. Judge Mark W. Klingensmith sits on the Fourth District Court
of Appeal in my home state of Florida, and in *Lyrics in the Law: Music’s Influence on
America’s Courts,* he presents a compendium of judicial decisions that quote song lyrics
resulting from his painstaking research of federal and state cases. Law librarians will
appreciate the description of Klingensmith’s research and case selection process in the
introduction.

¶24 The organizational system Klingensmith uses warms my nerdy librarian’s heart.
He organizes the book into chapters mostly based on broad musical genres—rock, pop,
standards, R&B, folk, rap, country, and stage and film—and then alphabetically by artist
within each chapter, and alphabetically by song for each included artist. Entire chapters
are devoted to cases that quote lyrics by the Beatles, Bob Dylan, and the team of Gilbert
(a former lawyer) and Sullivan, who wrote 14 comic operas together. I would have orga-
nized the book in a very similar manner, with a few different judgment calls that could
have gone either way.3

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University School of Law, Orlando, Florida.

3. For example, Judge Klingensmith categorizes Simon and Garfunkel as pop rather than folk and
Herman’s Hermits as rock rather than pop. I might have gone the other way on both.
Lyrics in the Law is a fun and easy book to browse through, and there are so many ways to read it: cover to cover, skipping to your favorite genres, or browsing for your favorite artists. For each quotation, Klingensmith provides a brief background of the case and explains where the musical quotation comes into play. I was pleased to see at least one judge had quoted a song by my favorite artist, Tom Waits. The line, “What the large print giveth, the small print taketh away” from “Step Right Up” appears in a products liability case involving insurance coverage.

I am always on the lookout for any pop culture references in case law to sprinkle into my lesson plans, and Lyrics in the Law will offer me some fun examples to draw from for future classes. Even though the book is lengthy, I was surprised by the dearth of cases under some of the chapter headings. The hip hop chapter, for instance, was disappointingly short. I hope judges continue to refer to song lyrics, giving Klingensmith material for a second edition. And, if they skew away from the familiar, well-trodden bands and songs that Baby Boomers and Generation Xers know best in favor of more modern artists, that would be fine with me, too.

One thing I would change about this book would be to place the case citations and additional comments in footnotes rather than endnotes after each chapter. Nevertheless, this entertaining book would make an excellent addition to academic law library and university library collections. I hope other music, pop culture, and legal researchers discover and enjoy this meticulously researched labor of love as much as I did.


Reviewed by Teresa Miguel-Stearns∗

Cal Newport has been writing about how we work for several years. His books, articles, and op-eds push us to find ways to engage in Deep Work (2016) and embrace Digital Minimalism (2019). His latest book, A World Without Email, expounds on several pieces he has written for the Chronicle of Higher Education, the New York Times, and the New Yorker, in which he explains why the way we work today is counterproductive and needs to change. As the title of his new book suggests, Newport, a data science professor at Georgetown University, takes aim at email—that once-beloved miracle that reconnected us with distant relatives and grammar school pals turned indispensable tool we love to hate.

Newport coined the phrase “hyperactive hive mind” to describe one’s mental state while constantly checking email, engaging in chat, and bouncing from one technology-based activity to another. The inability to engage in deep work while the hyperactive hive mind is working overtime is not earth-shattering news. We have witnessed the transition in the last 20 years from a workplace culture that afforded large blocks of

∗ © Teresa Miguel-Stearns, 2021. Associate Dean, Legal Information Innovation; Director, Law Library; and Professor of Law, Daniel F. Cracchiolo Law Library, James E. Rogers College of Law, University of Arizona, Tucson, Arizona.
uninterrupted time to a place where one is fortunate to have a single block of time during the week, much less every day. We have seen, as Newport so poignantly observes, our “workdays devolve into Sisyphean battles against [our] inboxes” (p.xv).

¶30 As a result, many of us rely on early mornings, late evenings, and weekends for those significant blocks of uninterrupted time to engage in meaningful writing and reflection away from technological interruptions. At the same time, and even more so during the pandemic, we spend much of our “free time” simply catching up on email so that we start the next day, week, or month without a nagging bold number next to Inbox.

¶31 We have heard this before. We have even implemented some of Newport’s ideas in our libraries with varying degrees of success. We know we are working in a hyperactive hive mind environment; we just haven’t figured out how to manage it. Disappointingly, Newport does not give us solutions, not for our kind of work.

¶32 Newport sorts knowledge sector workers into two discrete categories: (1) high-level specialists and (2) support staff. High-level specialists are, for example and for the benefit of this audience, faculty whose output is paramount to the success of the institution as well as their own. Support staff make up administrative units such as faculty assistants, human resources, and marketing.

¶33 With these two types of knowledge workers in mind, Newport invokes mid-20th century management theorist Peter Drucker, who coined the term “knowledge work” (p.89). Drucker advocated for knowledge workers’ autonomy over how to accomplish their tasks, with managers providing only the objectives and goals. Newport argues that managers have taken autonomy too far in allowing employees to determine how to organize their work. According to Newport, leaving the workflows entirely to the individual causes employees to fall into the hyperactive hive mind trap.

¶34 Newport is clearly onto something, but he fails to acknowledge an entire class of workers I call “hybrid knowledge workers.” Hybrid knowledge workers, such as librarians, provide intellectually demanding support to faculty and other patrons while teaching and pursuing their own research agendas. A library’s core mission is service, but an academic librarian’s career depends on knowledge work and output as well.

¶35 Libraries do not fit squarely within Newport’s examples of workplaces that will thrive once employees are freed of their inboxes. Newport’s knowledge workers are either individual contributors or members of project teams with a singular task. They can and should rely on project boards such as Trello rather than email to track their work. Just-in-time service to faculty, students, administrators, and other library patrons is what drives daily work in an academic library—and often the hyperactive hive mind.

¶36 I submit that we are moving in the right direction and must continue to experiment with workflows, as Newport suggests. Many libraries already implement some of Newport’s ideas. For example, we employ ticketing systems for reference questions and research support, use project boards for collaborative project and committee work, schedule “focus time” to free up blocks of time for deep work, and follow email best practices. But these measures have not reduced email to a manageable level, especially in this time of COVID and especially from our patrons and constituents outside our immediate library colleagues. We need to do more and be more creative.
¶37 Here’s one idea: Daimler AG, the German company that makes Mercedes-Benz, implemented a unique strategy for vacationing employees: an out-of-office reply telling the sender the intended recipient is on holiday and the email will not reach the inbox. The vacationing worker’s inbox auto-deletes all incoming emails, and the sender is instructed to resend at a later date or contact another employee. The worker returns from vacation to the same inbox they left. Ingenious—for those on vacation.

¶38 What about day to day? I don’t have a ready solution, and neither does Newport. Fully remote work due to COVID has only fueled the hyperactive hive mind environment, and the likely continuation of remote work in some form will require library managers to think strategically about the role of email in our workdays.

¶39 Librarians might be the most perfect example of hybrid knowledge workers—and this may be a self-serving, naïve, even ignorant declaration. But, I cannot think of another group of knowledge workers who, like academic librarians, are so evenly split between service as their core mission and scholarly output as a necessary career requirement. These dueling demands require a different approach to solving the hyperactive hive mind problem generally, and email inundation specifically, so that we can meet both demands superbly. As a result, this book is best suited to collections with a focus on interdisciplinary business titles.


Reviewed by Susan Gualtier*

¶40 The Digest of Orleans, drafted in French, was the first civil code of the territory of Louisiana. Its translation, the first such civil code written in English, gave birth to a vocabulary of the civil law in English still used today. In The Lost Translators of 1808 and the Birth of Civil Law in Louisiana, Vernon Palmer sets out two goals: first, to identify the two unknown translators of the Digest of Orleans of 1808; and second, to place their translation in the legal and historical context of the birth of Louisiana’s legal system. The result is an entertaining tale of two unique personalities, paired with an insightful evaluation of the long-criticized, yet tremendously important, translation of the Digest.

¶41 The translators’ names have, until now, remained unknown. Palmer’s search for them centers on a list of contributors printed in a statute on April 14, 1807. Marshalling evidence such as the timing of the statute, the amounts paid, and the circumstances surrounding their careers and connections, Palmer identifies the translators as Henry Paul Nugent and Auguste Davezac de Castera. He then shares brief biographies of Nugent, a mercurial teacher, dancer, translator, and satirical writer, and Davezac, a highly respected lawyer, translator, and politician. Palmer makes available to curious readers selected writings of both translators in an appendix.

¶42 The second half of the book evaluates the translation in the context of the birth of the Louisiana civil law. The translation was harshly criticized almost from its

inception and, indeed, contains some egregious (and, at times, hilarious) translation errors. Rather than focus on the errors, however, Palmer argues that the translators attempted to meet the needs of English-speaking, common law lawyers by attempting a “legal transposition” (p.53) rather than a literal translation. Many of the French words in the Digest were replaced with common law terms of art instead of being translated literally, suggesting that the translators deemed it necessary to impose English common law terminology on the civil law. Palmer points to a range of contextual factors supporting this choice, including the influx of Anglophone lawyers into New Orleans during the period immediately preceding the Digest, their inexperience with the civil law or its terminology and concepts, and the decrease in the number of lawyers who were capable of speaking or reading French. By introducing common law terminology and parallel concepts into the translation, the translators ensured that “the civil law arrived on the scene preemptively mixed and already resonating with common-law terms and ideas” (p.60). Thus, the 1808 translation of the Digest of Orleans helped give birth to Louisiana’s unique mixed legal system by preserving the civil law while producing “an immediate and almost unnoticed reception of common-law ideas” (id.).

¶43 Palmer includes extensive notes and a bibliography, showing the impressive and persuasive evidence for his claim. Even if one does not agree with Palmer’s identification of the translators, Nugent’s and Davezac’s stories are compelling and worth reading, as both were prominent in the early Louisiana legal profession. The second half of the book, analyzing the translation itself, is an interesting exploration of Louisiana legal history and legal translation more generally; it should appeal to readers interested in those topics. This portion stands alone and can be read apart from the section identifying the translators.

¶44 Overall, this brief volume is entertaining and insightful. It is highly recommended for libraries collecting in the areas of civil law, Louisiana law, legal translation, and legal history.


Reviewed by Christine Park*

¶45 In Break ’Em Up: Recovering Our Freedom from Big Ag, Big Tech, and Big Money, Zephyr Teachout, a law professor at Fordham University and a former Democratic gubernatorial and congressional candidate in New York, makes the salient and timely case for the revitalization of the antitrust movement in the United States. In around 300 pages, Teachout systemically chronicles how America has become a land of monopolies, how a few corporations have come to exert control over Americans’ everyday lives, and how communities across the country can fight back.

¶46 The first eight chapters of the book outline how monopolists have changed the economy into a quasi-economic/quasi-political system, subverting democracy and the
freedom of individuals. To set the stage, Teachout first describes the “Chickenization” of the American middle class. “Chickenization” is the process by which three poultry giants have thoroughly transformed the chicken industry using a processor-control model driven directly by changes to antitrust laws from the Reagan administration. This transformation enabled chicken processors to consolidate power through both vertical and horizontal mergers, allowing them complete control over the chicken distribution process. Teachout insightfully demonstrates that this model has spread to other industries, using examples like Uber and Seamless, which decentralize labor while centralizing power and decision-making abilities.

¶47 Teachout details exactly how large technology companies, particularly Google, Facebook, and Amazon, have systematically destroyed both competition and independent journalism, used advertising algorithms to surveil users, and garnered political power, ultimately acting as quasi-governmental, quasi-business entities. She further explains how billionaires, oligarchs, and Wall Street have used their wealth and power to successfully lobby against antimonopoly rules, essentially gaming the system.

¶48 But after eight chapters of endless examples of bad corporate practices that paint a bleak economic and moral future, Teachout remains optimistic, outlining ways for her readers to fight back. Instead of admonishing readers for continuing to use Google and Facebook or for buying products from major companies, Teachout asserts that boycotting is ineffective and unreasonable. Rather, she encourages readers to fight for antimonopoly laws and create a moral economy by using antimonopoly activism as the blueprint.

¶49 However, it’s difficult to embrace this optimism while reading Break ’Em Up, especially in light of recent defeats for workers. One example is the failed effort to form the first Amazon warehouse union in Bessemer, Alabama, despite nationwide and even presidential support. Another is the success of Uber and Lyft in the campaign to pass Proposition 22 in California, which allows them to continue classifying their drivers as independent contractors and avoiding obligations to provide employment benefits such as health insurance and paid sick leave.

¶50 Teachout’s main argument is that the people have the power to change the system. She tells the long history of the antimonopoly movement in the United States and believes that we are currently in the early stages of a new antimonopoly era. She makes the persuasive point that the largest hurdle is not the overwhelming wealth and power of the billionaires and monopolies but the passivity of the people. In the last chapter of Break ’Em Up, Teachout paints a new and brighter picture, one in which antimonopoly activism has persisted and changed the fabric of society. In the year 2040, rural America and smaller cities are flourishing after Congress has reinstated Glass-Steagall Act requirements, the courts have overturned the Citizens United corporate campaign finance case, and the people have organized and taken back their power. Recommended for academic law libraries, especially those with strong political science or antitrust collections.

*Reviewed by Miriam A. Murphy*

¶51 Lin-Manuel Miranda’s award-winning stage production *Hamilton: An American Musical* inspired this collection of 33 chapter-length essays written by legal scholars, including Erwin Chemerinsky and former U.S. solicitor general Gregory Garre. The chapters fall under loosely defined themes, separated into eight parts, such as the structure of the government and federalism; diversity issues surrounding race, gender, and immigration status; and the legacy of Alexander Hamilton along with the other Founders. Within each of these themes, the individual authors take a range of approaches, from providing historical context and investigating the critical issues covered in *Hamilton* through a modern legal lens to assessing the impact of Hamilton the man and *Hamilton* the production.

¶52 As with many edited compilations, there are benefits and shortcomings to this format. The brief essays, from five to ten pages, make for a fast read, offering the reader a quick introduction and overview of many captivating topics. While many of the topics are a perfect fit for a short reflection piece, however, others are more complex and could have benefited from further development and explanation. Because each chapter addresses a unique topic and each author presents a unique writing style, the collection is better read in short bursts rather than consecutively, allowing for deeper reflection and absorption of each issue.

¶53 As self-proclaimed *Hamilton* fans, many of the contributors incorporate the musical’s libretto into their teaching of critical legal and societal concepts. *Hamilton* revisits the vision of Hamilton as a well-known Federalist advocating for a strong central government, including a centralized bank, both in historical context and through a modern lens. Several chapters draw parallels between the power struggle of the Founders over states’ rights versus central authority and the actions of former president Donald Trump. Alexander Hamilton is recast as a visionary, with one author contending that the play exerts more current impact than Hamilton’s original writings. Historians will appreciate the modern lens applied to Hamilton’s life as a child laborer, immigrant, outsider, and advocate for an unpopular cause. Chemerinsky’s chapter on Hamilton’s central bank as the nexus of conflict for the *McCulloch v. Maryland* decision,4 which established the authority of Congress in its relationship with the states via the Necessary and Proper Clause of the Constitution, recognizes Hamilton’s significant legacy.


4. 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
¶54 The treatment of race is particularly significant. Many of the writers recognize Miranda’s deliberate racial ambiguity of Hamilton’s characters as a mechanism to engage the audience on issues of race and power during the founding era and encourage viewers to consider how racial privileges and power structures persist. Several essays note that the lost voices of oppressed persons of color are finally heard through Hamilton’s retelling of history and its often ironic libretto.

¶55 Hamilton’s Angelica Schulyer’s cry to “compel him to include women in the sequel” (p.95) titles the section analyzing women’s early exclusion from legal protections and the development of women’s rights up to modern times by way of essays on domestic violence, marital rights, and employment rights. Hamilton is analyzed from several additional perspectives in chapters dealing with copyright, employment law, military oaths, travel bans, dueling, defamation, elections, banking, and the powers of boards of directors. Many of these chapters address topics worthy of much deeper study.

¶56 It is not necessary to have seen the musical Hamilton or to have listened to the score to appreciate this book and learn from its component parts. These essays serve as a solid launching point for anyone wanting to research the origins of the country and its implications for race, privilege, power, and conflict. Contributing author Anthony Paul Farley starts his chapter with the following analysis of the stage production, which applies equally well to this volume: “Hamilton: An American Musical is a history and a prophecy, a public memory of the America that will be. Hamilton asks us to reimagine the Founders, to see them from the inside and illuminate our beginning by our cosmopolitan present” (p.75). Highly recommended for academic libraries, both general and law-specific.


Reviewed by Morgan M. Stoddard*

¶57 When people think about the relationship between racism and the law, they are likely to focus first on topics such as criminal justice or voting rights, not intellectual property law. In The Color of Creatorship, however, Anjali Vats demonstrates that intellectual property law is also subject to the problems caused by systemic racism and neocolonialism. In a work impressive in both its scope and interdisciplinarity, Vats draws on law, history, critical race theory, and rhetoric to examine how U.S. copyright, patent, and trademark law have discriminated against people of color from the inception of the nation’s first intellectual property laws in the late 18th century to today.

¶58 As a scholar of law, race, communication, and rhetoric, Vats takes a novel and compelling approach to race and intellectual property law. She uses rhetorical analysis and critical race theory to examine selected intellectual property cases and to trace

racial scripts that appear throughout the history of intellectual property law, negatively affecting creators of color. Vats describes this approach as a type of “Critical Race IP,” which “is a tool for bringing [Critical Race Theory] and Critical Intellectual Property . . . together in multidisciplinary ways that highlight how intellectual property law protects whiteness as property” (p.13). Vats also draws an interesting connection between intellectual property creatorship and citizenship, explaining how copyright, patent, and trademark law have been shaped by the romanticized notion of an inventor/creator who is generally a white male and represents an ideal “intellectual property citizen” (p.8). This notion has led to an intellectual property system that discriminates against people of color by generally treating them as “bad intellectual property citizen[s]” (id.).

¶59 Vats organizes her analysis of U.S. intellectual property law over the last 200 years into three time periods. The first is defined by “formal racism” (p.66), the second is a period of “racial liberalism” (p.67), and the third is a “postracial era” (p.111). For each period, Vats explores cases showing how negative racial scripts and neocolonialism pervade copyright, trademark, and patent law. Several cases will be known to readers with some knowledge of intellectual property law, such as *Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.*, a seminal case on parody as fair use under copyright law involving a song by the rap group 2 Live Crew. Other cases, such as a case in 1790 that decided the copyrightability of the first book of poetry published by an African American, are likely less familiar and bring attention to less well-known aspects of intellectual property law’s discriminatory history.

¶60 While most of *The Color of Creatorship* is dedicated to revealing the history of racism and neocolonialism in intellectual property law, Vats also advocates for ways to move toward racial equality in this area. She argues that “intellectual property fugitive[s]” (p.207) can erode racist intellectual property laws by using “performative acts of resistance” (p.156) to challenge racial scripts around creatorship. She puts forward the example of the musician Prince’s efforts to challenge the terms of his recording contract and the music industry’s treatment of artists in general by changing his name to the “Love Symbol” (p.160). Vats also argues that “decolonial theory” can be used to create “racially and economically equitable copyright, patent, and trademark policies” (pp.192–93) by, for example, acknowledging the value placed on whiteness in intellectual property law and recognizing and protecting traditional knowledge and non-Western contributions to arts and sciences.

¶61 While *The Color of Creatorship* is an outstanding book, there are two aspects worth discussing critically. First, Vats identifies important connections between intellectual property law, history, and sociocultural issues that expose racial inequalities and discrimination that may be hidden behind seemingly race-neutral laws and justifications. In a few instances, however, some of the connections seem tenuous, such as when Vats explores a relationship between trademark dilution law and white concerns about racial purity, hinging her argument mostly on the use of the term “dilution” in both contexts to describe tarnishing an identity. The second critique is that Vats does not

always adequately define concepts or provide enough background information for readers not already well versed in intellectual property law, critical race theory, and rhetorical analysis. For example, there is an extensive discussion of the problematic way that U.S. copyright law treats sampling in rap music, but sampling itself is never explained. *The Color of Creatorship* could benefit from a glossary or additional explanatory footnotes.

¶62 In this book, Vats makes a unique and important contribution to the conversation about systemic racism in the United States and the implications for intellectual property law. Studying and addressing racism in intellectual property law is vital, especially in light of the ever-increasing role of intellectual property in the global economy. As Vats notes, “[i]n the so-called information economy, intellectual property justice is racial justice” (p.4). Ultimately, *The Color of Creatorship* is a valuable addition to any academic law library collection and particularly relevant for libraries that are actively working to develop antiracist and more diverse, equitable, and inclusive collections.


*Reviewed by Olli S. Baker*

¶63 With the confirmation of Brett Kavanaugh to the U.S. Supreme Court, it seemed to many that *Roe v. Wade*, the 1973 Supreme Court decision that established a constitutional right to choose an abortion, faced a realistic chance of being overruled. With the subsequent confirmation of Amy Coney Barrett that likelihood grew, and numerous states are now drafting legislation with the openly declared intent to provide a basis for overruling *Roe*. Whether that comes to pass remains to be seen, but it is almost certain that the nation’s high court will soon be revisiting the abortion debate, which makes law professor and legal historian Mary Ziegler’s new book, *Abortion and the Law in America*, a timely contribution.

¶64 Ziegler argues that the history of the abortion debate since *Roe* has been misunderstood. Critics have often placed the blame for the polarized state of the abortion question on the Supreme Court. *Roe*, the argument goes, was a sweeping decision that made compromise impossible, exacerbating rather than resolving existing differences. The premise behind this argument is that *Roe* took one of two sides in the battle between absolute principles: the right of the woman to choose to have an abortion and the right of the fetus to live. Each of these rights-based principles claims to be “grounded in the constitutional order, and deserving of protection irrespective of its costs and

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benefits (p.2). Ziegler establishes a contrast between the traditional rights-based understanding of the debate and one focused more on costs and benefits, and shows how the latter has the potential to more effectively explain the dynamics of the issue.

§65 Rights-based arguments, Ziegler acknowledges, took the forefront immediately following *Roe*. Abortion rights activists were content with the decision that found a constitutional right in their favor, while anti-abortion activists responded by proposing a constitutional amendment that would either return the abortion debate to the states or establish a constitutional right to life for the fetus. When these latter efforts failed, the pro-life camp turned to a cost-benefit strategy, in part out of simple necessity following the failure of personhood-based initiatives.

§66 The first major abortion-related legislation to follow *Roe* was the Hyde Amendment, which prohibits Medicaid funding for abortions. The justification for the law posed a conceptual problem for rights-based absolutists, as it simply reduced women’s access to abortion providers and thus the overall number of abortions rather than declaring abortions illegal. Justifying such incremental restrictions required the anti-abortion camp to shift focus to a cost-benefit analysis. When the Supreme Court replaced *Roe*’s trimester framework with the undue burden standard in *Planned Parenthood v. Casey*, the shift to a cost-benefit analysis was complete, as the debate from thereon would require some external context for what constituted an undue burden. As Ziegler shows, this context expanded to include not only women’s autonomy and the traditional family structure in a time of changing social values but also less likely areas such as changes in the structure of healthcare delivery and welfare spending.

§67 Ziegler’s book is well researched and extensively documented; a full third of the text’s bulk is devoted to footnotes. It also contains a table of acronyms, especially helpful in navigating the discussion of various advocacy groups. The book is well organized, and the presentation shows how the various arguments and strategies changed as the legislatures and courts developed the law. Ziegler maintains scholarly objectivity throughout and does not advocate for any particular side; rather, her analysis focuses on the factors that have informed the debate itself and how they have developed since *Roe*.

§68 The overall point of Ziegler’s cost-benefit analysis comes through, and for the most part her analysis supports her conclusions, but the focus is occasionally a bit imprecise. The phrase “costs and benefits of abortion” recurs like a mantra throughout the text, but sometimes the discussion that follows seems oddly dissociated, with the result that the idea is asserted rather than explained. In some instances, the idea of costs and benefits itself suffers from vagueness. For example, Ziegler refers to legislation outlawing abortion once a fetal heartbeat is detected, stating this effort “reflected the importance of debate about who had the competence to measure the costs and benefits of abortion” (p.204). This sort of legislation, however, is predicated on one definition of personhood—it simply prohibits abortion after a certain point—and Ziegler does not

present a clear cost-benefit analysis implicated by this type of legislation. To be fair, Ziegler notes at the outset that it is sometimes conceptually difficult to separate a right from its practical application, and the discussion of one will necessarily involve some overlap with the other. Even so, there are a few points where establishing the distinction with more clarity would have been helpful. This vagueness, however, does not ultimately obscure the larger point and, in the end, the cost-benefit analysis proves to be an insightful means of approaching the issue.

¶69 Readers looking for a nuanced analysis of the abortion debate’s evolution will appreciate this book. Because of the focus on strategies and arguments employed by advocacy groups, there isn’t a great deal of specifically jurisprudential discussion, for which readers would be better off with something like N.E.H. Hull and Peter Charles Hoffer’s Roe v. Wade: The Abortion Rights Controversy in American History, an updated edition of which has just been published. The absence of esoteric legal analysis does, however, make the book more accessible for scholars from related fields such as political science, sociology, or women’s studies. Overall, Abortion and the Law in America is extensive, well documented, and convincing, and it will make a valuable and timely addition for law and academic libraries.